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ARE STATE PUBLIC OPTION HEALTH PLANS
WORTH IT?
JAIME S. KING,* KATHERINE L. GUDIKSEN†,
ERIN C. FUSE BROWN‡
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the weaknesses of the U.S. health care
system’s reliance on private, employer-based health insurance. The crisis in
health care access and affordability has increased support for a public option—
the choice to purchase a state-initiated health plan with publicly determined
rates. Congressional gridlock, however, may dim the chances for a federal public option. States have stepped into the policy vacuum, proposing forty-nine bills
to establish state public options since 2010, including three that became law.
This article provides a comprehensive survey and taxonomy of state public option proposals from 2010–2021, identifying three main models: (1) Medicaid
Buy-In Public Options; (2) Marketplace-Based Public Options; and (3) Comprehensive Public Options. Though each model serves different policy goals and
varies in scope, the defining aim of all public option plans is to improve access
to affordable health coverage by applying public payment rates to the private
insurance market. We seek to answer whether state public option plans are legally viable and “worth it” for states to pursue. The answer is yes to both, but,
surprisingly, the degree of legal difficulty is inversely related to the scope of the
plan’s reach—the broadest plans have fewer legal hurdles than narrower plans.
Moreover, the policy effects increase with the scope of the plan and the robustness of the controls on provider payment rates. Public options with modest provider rate controls may have too little impact on affordability and costs, falling
short of their defining goal of improving affordability. As a result, the legal and
political difficulty of enacting such plans may not be worth it. State public option
plans may be most effective when they cover a broad swath of the population
and pursue robust provider rate controls. In short, for state public option plans
to be worth it, bigger is better.
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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic laid bare the inadequacies of the U.S. healthcare system for the nation, and the world, to see. One of the most glaring
deficiencies was the tether between employment and health insurance.1 As
more than five million Americans watched in disbelief as the pandemic took
their jobs,2 many of them had the dual realization that they also lost their
employer-sponsored health insurance in the midst of the largest pandemic in
over a century.3 The need for comprehensive and affordable public health
insurance options irrespective of employment has never been more apparent.
Yet with the nation embroiled in the continued onslaught of COVID-19,
comprehensive action at the federal level remains a distant possibility. Even
with the election of Joe Biden, who favors a national public health insurance
option,4 Congress remains closely divided, so the path to sweeping federal
health reform appears difficult. Back in 2010, when the Democrats controlled far more seats in Congress, insurance companies successfully lobbied
to strip the public option from the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).5 With a
1
See generally Jaime S. King, Covid-19 and the Need for Health Care Reform, 382 N.
ENG. J. MED. e104(1) (2020).
2
See GENE FALK, PAUL D. ROMERO, ISAAC A. NICCHITTA & EMMA C. NYHOF, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R46554, UNEMPLOYMENT RATES DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: IN BRIEF 2
(2021).
3
See Daniel McDermott, Cynthia Cox, Robin Rudowitz & Rachel Garfield, How Has the
Pandemic Affected Health Coverage in the U.S.?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 9, 2020), https://
www.kff.org/policy-watch/how-has-the-pandemic-affected-health-coverage-in-the-u-s/ [https:/
/perma.cc/4B3W-RBRM].
4
See Health Care, BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/
SYC7-KJZH].
5
See Jacob S. Hacker, From the ACA to Medicare for All, in THE TRILLION DOLLAR
REVOLUTION 333, 336 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Abbe R. Gluck eds., 2020); Richard M. Scheffler & Taylor L. Wang, The Public Option: From Hacker to Biden, PETRIS CTR. (Sept. 22,
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bare Senate majority in 2021, passing a federal public option will prove even
more challenging, as such a broad reform would require sixty votes to overcome the Senate filibuster.6 Due to federal gridlock, the most likely path to
health reform in the near-term is through the states, which have been devising their own policies to provide increased access to affordable health care.
One mechanism for achieving health reform is through the creation of a
state-based public health insurance plan or a “public option.” A state public
option is a state-initiated health insurance plan created by the state legislature that pays providers publicly determined rates and is offered to a significant share of the private health insurance market. Designed to place
competitive pricing pressure on private plans, public options offer coverage
to individuals who are privately insured or uninsured.7
The concept of a federal public option was launched into the national
health policy debate by Barack Obama and health policy scholar Jacob
Hacker, who argued for its inclusion in the ACA.8 Hacker argued that public
option plans could operate more efficiently than private plans by lowering
administrative costs, eliminating corporate profits, negotiating and setting
prices for health care services and prescription drugs, and providing a competitive benchmark to private plans.9 In the political push to pass the ACA,
however, the public option was dropped from the legislation, leaving the
health insurance Marketplaces, websites where eligible individuals can
purchase subsidized, comprehensive health plans that are barred from certain
discriminatory practices, to offer only private health plans.10 Absent competitive pressure from a public option, private plans both on and off the ACA
Marketplaces have suffered from dwindling competition and have not substantially controlled costs.11
2020), https://petris.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/The-Public-Option-From-Hacker-toBiden.pdf [https://perma.cc/AGX5-9VCG].
6
See Sarah Kliff & Margot Sanger-Katz, With New Majority, Here’s What Democrats
Can (and Can’t) Do on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/01/07/upshot/biden-democrats-heath-plans.html [https://perma.cc/RP4R-M2RC].
7
See Hacker, supra note 5, at 336; Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and
Demise of the Public Option, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1117, 1117–18 (2010) (“The concept was to
offer a publicly insured plan in direct competition with other options for private health insurance coverage, in the hope of driving down both premiums and underlying health care
costs.”).
8
See Halpin & Harbage, supra note 7, at 1118–19; JACOB S. HACKER, INST. FOR AM.’S
FUTURE & UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY L., THE CASE FOR PUBLIC PLAN CHOICE IN NATIONAL
HEALTH REFORM: KEY TO COST CONTROL AND QUALITY COVERAGE 1 (2008), https://
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Hacker_final_to_post.pdf [https://perma.cc/7N42-XQ8V].
9
See Hacker, supra note 5, at 6.
10
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & John E. McDonough, The Path to the Affordable Care Act,
in THE TRILLION DOLLAR REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 35–36; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, ‘Public
Option’ in Health Plan May Be Dropped, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2009), https://
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/health/policy/18talkshows.html [https://perma.cc/XNL9EF3J].
11
See, e.g., Josh Bivens, The Unfinished Business of Health Reform, ECON. POL’Y INST.
(Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/health-care-report/ [https://perma.cc/83ZLF7HH]; Lemore Dafny, Health Care Markets a Decade after the ACA, Bigger, but Probably
Not Better, in THE TRILLION DOLLAR REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 264, 264–66, 272–73;
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States have tried to pick up where the ACA fell short by legislating
state public option plans to solve their persistent health care coverage and
cost problems. Yet state policymakers’ hands are tied by federal law, which
imposes a variety of requirements and restrictions on state public option proposals, depending on the type of plan. Some requirements ensure minimum
levels of coverage and quality. For instance, if a state wants to offer a public
option on the Marketplace, the plan must satisfy the ACA’s requirements for
qualified health plans (“QHPs”) and include the essential health benefits
(“EHBs”) or receive a waiver from the Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”).12 Other federal laws hinder the development and efficacy
of state public option plans by limiting design options, target populations,
and the scope of coverage. Federal Medicaid law significantly constrains
Medicaid buy-in options by prohibiting states from using federal funds to
expand Medicaid coverage beyond those statutorily eligible and from placing public option enrollees in the same risk pool as Medicaid enrollees.13 The
ACA prohibits undocumented individuals from enrolling in health insurance
plans on the Marketplaces. It requires states to ignore one of the largest
segments of the uninsured population or offer public option plans off the
Marketplaces, diminishing their ability to build on Marketplace investments
and potentially destabilizing the Marketplaces. The Employee Retirement
and Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), whose broad preemption provision has long stymied state health regulation,14 prohibits states from requiring self-insured employers to participate in public option plans, but allows
states to nudge employers to adopt the plans.15 States also have a comparative disadvantage in financing their public option plans, as they must balance
their budgets and have limited ability to raise new taxes.16 In sum, state
public option plans have more legal and fiscal constraints than a federal
version.
Despite these limitations, states have persisted in proposing public option plans. Yet we lack a comprehensive understanding of how states are
designing their public option proposals. This article fills the gap. We define a
state public option as a state-initiated health insurance plan that is offered to
Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Amol S. Navathe, Delivery-System Reforms: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the ACA’s Delivery System Reforms at Slowing Cost Growth and Improving Quality
and Patient Experience, in THE TRILLION DOLLAR REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 225, 228;
Carrie H. Colla & Jonathan Skinner, Has the ACA Made Health Care More Affordable?, in
THE TRILLION DOLLAR REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 250, 251; Joseph R. Antos & James C.
Capretta, The ACA: Trillions? Yes. A Revolution? No., HEALTH AFFS. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200406.93812/full/ [https://perma.cc/GJ9SKWNJ].
12
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18021, 18022, 18052.
13
See infra Section I.B.
14
See, e.g., Erin C. Fuse Brown & Ameet Sarpatwari, Removing ERISA’s Impediment to
State Health Reform, 378 N. ENG. J. MED. 5 (2018).
15
See infra Section III.C.1.
16
See Lindsay F. Wiley, Medicaid for All? State-Level Single-Payer Health Care, 79
OHIO ST. L.J. 843, 875 (2018).
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a significant share of the private health insurance market—the individual,
small group, or large group market—and pays publicly determined rates.
State public option plans are state-initiated if they enter the market as a result of a state legislative action and they pay publicly-determined rates by
pegging payments to existing public program rates (e.g., Medicare or Medicaid rates) or through administrative rate-setting. Consistent with other
health policy and economics experts’ understanding of a public option, states
need not administer or finance a plan for it to be “public.”17 Although some
may contest whether a privately administered plan with publicly determined
rates is sufficiently “public” to be called a public option, we adopted this
broad definition to capture the range of states’ attempts to create—in their
words—a public option health plan as an alternative to private coverage.18
This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of state efforts to
create public option plans and offers a roadmap of the legal issues and policy
tradeoffs states must navigate to reform their health systems through a public
option plan. As each state must analyze its own economic and political environment to determine the viability of a particular health reform, it is impossible to prescribe a single best public option for all states. Instead, the article
seeks to answer whether a state public option is legally possible and, if so,
when it is worth it.
To answer these questions, we analyzed all public option bills introduced in state legislatures from 2010–2021 and assessed the legal viability
of each.19 We limited our search to bills that could, if passed, implement a
public option health plan. We excluded bills that need further legislative action to implement, including those that created a task force to examine the
possibility of a public option. We counted a bill in each legislative session it
was introduced but did not count a bill twice if it was introduced into both
chambers during the same session. Applying this methodology, we identified
forty-nine bills introduced by twenty-three states between 2010 and 2021 to
create a public health insurance option as shown in the Appendix. To date,
three states have enacted a public option: Washington’s 2019 law began offering coverage on January 1, 2021;20 Colorado’s law passed in 2021, begin17

See, e.g., Leemore Dafny, Health Care Markets a Decade After the ACA, in THE TRILDOLLAR REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 273–74; Allison K. Hoffman, The Irony of Health
Care’s Public Option, in DEBATING THE PUBLIC OPTION (Anne Alstott & Ganesh Sitaraman
eds., Cambridge University Press) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1) (on file with authors); Lindsay F. Wiley, Privatized Public Health Insurance and the Goals of Progressive Health Reform,
54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
18
This article attempts to categorize and analyze recent state attempts to create what they
view as a public option plan, and sidesteps the debate of what should qualify as a “public”
option, being held elsewhere in the literature. See, e.g., Wiley, supra note 16, at 864–67.
19
Our original survey focused on state public option bills introduced from 2010 to 2020.
Due to the timing of this publication, we added bills that were introduced or passed in the 2021
legislative session as of June 30, 2021, when most, but not all state legislative sessions concluded. The 2021 bills are discussed in Part IV. See infra Part IV.
20
WASH. REV. CODE §43.71.095 (2019); see Sara Hansard, Public Option Experiment
Hits Speed Bump as Premiums Don’t Fall, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 10, 2020, 2:30 AM), https:/
LION
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ning coverage in 2023;21 and Nevada enacted a public option in 2021 to go
into effect in 2026.22
This article provides a taxonomy and detailed analysis of state public
option bills to determine whether and how state policymakers can design
bills to fit their policy goals. From our survey of state public option bills, we
identify three main models for state public options: Medicaid Buy-In Public
Options; Marketplace-Based Public Options; and Comprehensive Public Options.23 Although most bills fall into only one model, a handful of bills straddle models. Five main policy goals motivate state public options: (1)
controlling health insurance costs; (2) covering the uninsured; (3) reducing
the effects of cycling on and off public coverage (i.e., churn); (4) improving
competition; and (5) simplifying plan administration. Although these policy
goals are not mutually exclusive, some may be contradictory.24 As a result,
state policy goals should drive the design of public option plans. The most
important considerations include: (1) the target population; (2) plan administration; (3) plan financing and cost control; and (4) the impact on the private
health insurance and provider markets.
We conclude that state public option plans are both legally possible and
worth it, but, surprisingly, the legal viability and policy effects increase with
the scope of the plan. In other words, with state public option plans, bigger is
better. The degree of legal difficulty to establish a state public option plan is
inversely related to the scope of the plan’s reach—the broadest plans have
surprisingly fewer legal hurdles than narrower plans, though broad plans
may significantly disrupt the existing health care market, creating greater
political opposition. A public option plan with modest provider rate controls
may have too little impact on affordability and costs to make it worth the
legal and political difficulties passing it would entail. This is especially true
considering that this type of plan would fall short of its defining goal—
improving affordability through the application of public payment rates to
the private insurance market. Overall, state public option plans that cover a
broader swath of the population and pursue robust provider rate controls are
most likely to be effective.
This article proceeds in five parts. Parts I–III provide taxonomies and
detailed analyses of the three state public option models. Each Part uses
/news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/public-option-experiment-hits-speedbump-as-premiums-dont-fall [https://perma.cc/ULM6-KCK3].
21
H.B. 21-1232, 73rd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021).
22
S.B. 420, 2021 Leg., 81st Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2021). Though our survey only covered
2010–2020, we discuss the 2021 bills in Part IV. See infra Part IV.
23
We also identified a couple of states that proposed a buy-in to their State Employee
Health Benefit Plan (SEHBP) but dismissed it due to legal and practical constraints. States
seeking to create a public option based on their SEHBP should offer a similar plan on the
Marketplace. See H.P. 91, 129th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019); C.B. 134, Jan. 2019 Sess. § 7
(Conn. 2019); S.B. 1004, Jan. 2019 Sess. § 1(i) (Conn. 2019).
24
For example, covering the remaining uninsured and reducing churn may be mutually
compatible, but creating a public option to increase competition on the Marketplaces may
work against the goals of administrative simplification. See infra Section I.
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specific examples from state legislation to analyze each public option model
based on its design features, policy goals, target population, administrative
requirements, financing options, market impact, and potential legal and political challenges. Part IV provides an update of public option legislation in
2021, including the passage of marketplace-based public option plans in Nevada and Colorado. Though we do not prescribe what any state ought to do
or how it should weigh the tradeoffs in the first four Parts, Part V then
synthesizes and draws lessons from the last decade of state public option
legislation and provides guidance and recommendations to states on the development of a public option plan based on their specific policy goals, resources, and political environment.
Overall, states should design their public option plan with a clear sense
of their policy goals and tolerance for administrative burdens, financial risk,
and political opposition. Only once they consider their options in light of
these factors will they know if it is truly “worth it.”
I. MEDICAID BUY-IN PUBLIC OPTIONS
Since the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid, appreciation for the program
has grown due to its comprehensive benefits, low costs, existing infrastructure, and access to federal matching funds, making it an especially attractive
framework for states seeking to craft a public option.25 Medicaid provides
publicly funded coverage for people living in low-income households and is
jointly financed and regulated by the state and federal governments.26 The
ACA allowed states to expand Medicaid coverage to include adults under
age sixty-five with incomes at or below 138% of the federal poverty level
(“FPL”), with the federal government providing ninety percent of the funding for the Medicaid expansion and states funding ten percent.27 Medicaid
offers comparatively comprehensive benefits at relatively low costs because
of low provider reimbursement rates and administrative costs.28 And, most

25

See Michael Ollove, The Politics of Medicaid Expansion Have Changed, PEW: STATE(Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/
2019/11/13/the-politics-of-medicaid-expansion-have-changed [https://perma.cc/3T3QMD97].
26
See Wiley, supra note 16, at 848 (citing ELICIA J. HERZ, JEAN HEARNE, JULIE STONEAXELRAD, KAREN TRITZ, EVELYNE BAUMRUCKER, CHRISTINE SCOTT, CHRIS PETERSON, AORIL
GRADY & RICHARD RIMKUNAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 32277, HOW MEDICAID WORKS: PROGRAM BASICS 1–2 (2006)); Federal and State Share of Medicaid Spending, KAISER FAM.
FOUND., https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/federalstate -share-of-spending/ [https://
perma.cc/Z22V-US4J].
27
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k).
28
See TERESA A. COUGHLIN, SHARON K. LONG, LISA CLEMANS-COPE & DEAN RESNICK,
KAISER FAM. FOUND., WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES MEDICAID MAKE? ASSESSING COST EFFECTIVENESS, ACCESS, AND FINANCIAL PROTECTION UNDER MEDICAID FOR LOW-INCOME ADULTS
1, 7 (2013), https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/8440-what-difference-doesmedicaid-make2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DWV7-YP24].
LINE
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critically from the perspective of a state, at least half of the costs of Medicaid are funded by the federal medical assistance percentage (“FMAP”).29
But, as we discuss below, the legal constraints of the federal Medicaid
statute mean that a pure buy-in is impossible for states to effectuate, belying
its intuitive simplicity. Instead, two types of Medicaid buy-ins emerged as
viable options. First, states may require their contracted Medicaid managed
care organizations to offer a similar plan—in terms of benefits, provider
network, and rates—to individuals ineligible for Medicaid.30 Second, states
may create a public option, administered by the state Medicaid agency, that
targets the uninsured who are ineligible for federal Marketplace subsidies or
Medicaid.31 To encompass both viable alternatives, our analysis includes any
state proposal that builds upon or leverages the Medicaid program to cover
residents that are otherwise ineligible for Medicaid.
In the past eleven years, sixteen states introduced twenty-two bills that
met our criteria of a Medicaid buy-in.32 The Medicaid buy-in bills typically
direct the state agency overseeing the Medicaid program to establish a public
option and apply for any necessary federal waivers, many without further
detail.33 These bills tend to be much less specific than the public option plans
29
See ALISON MITCHELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43847, MEDICAID’S FEDERAL MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGE (FMAP) 2 (2020).
30
A few states already require contracted Medicaid managed care organizations to offer a
plan on the exchange, but we do not consider those public options, as the state does not determine the specifics of these plans or provider rates, except that they must meet the requirements
of the state exchange. See Louise Norris, Nevada Health Insurance Marketplace: History and
News of the State’s Exchange, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Aug. 25, 2021), https://
www.healthinsurance.org/nevada-state-health-insurance-exchange/#MCO [https://perma.cc/
VP6E-Q9MA]; Kevin Lucia, Jack Hoadley, Sabrina Corlette, Dania Palanker & Olivia Hoppe,
Stepping into the Breach: How States and Insurers Worked Together to Prevent Bare Counties
for 2018, URB. INST. (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/steppingbreach-how-states-and-insurers-worked-together-prevent-bare-counties-2018 [https://
perma.cc/2RL3-CZQY]. For an example of a state requiring Medicaid managed care organizations to offer a public option, see, e.g., S.B. 339, 2019 Leg., 155th Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2020)
(stating “The department shall be authorized to. . . Make health care coverage available for
purchase through the Georgia Reliable Insurance Network. . .Such network shall: (1) Include,
at a minimum: (A) The same coverage provided to recipients of Medicaid. . .The department
shall: (1) Administer the network through the managed care organizations under contract with
the department to provide Medicaid services and benefits”).
31
See, e.g., S.B. 405, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2019) (stating that “the department
shall establish a medicaid buy-in plan and shall offer the buy-in plan for purchase by a resident: (1) who is ineligible for the following: (a) medicaid; (b) medicare; and (c) advance
premium tax credits under the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; and (2)
whose employer has not disenrolled or denied the resident enrollment in employer-sponsored
health coverage on the basis that the resident would otherwise qualify for enrollment in medicaid buy-in coverage.”).
32
In addition to these bills, Minnesota legislators introduced five state proposals to build
on the state’s Basic Health Program (BHP). See S.F. 58, 2017 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2017);
S.F. 684, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn. 2019); S.F. 720, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn. 2019);
S.F. 1080, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn. 2019); S.F. 2356, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn. 2019).
While conceptually similar to Medicaid buy-ins, BHP buy-ins face distinct legal hurdles and
are not included here.
33
See, e.g., S.B. 444, 121st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2019) (providing that
“[t]o the extent allowed by federal law, the office shall establish the Indiana statewide health
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discussed in the following sections. The brevity of these bills may reflect
uncertainty about the legal constraints that determine the structure of a
Medicaid buy-in plan, such as the need for or approval of federal waivers, or
it may purposefully grant state Medicaid officials the flexibility to design the
plan to fit the specific population and policy goals of the state and permit the
legislature to avoid tackling more politically fraught decisions like provider
reimbursement.
Of the Medicaid buy-in efforts, bills in Nevada (2017) and New Mexico (2019) advanced the furthest.34 In Nevada, the governor vetoed the 2017
bill passed by the state legislature to offer a Medicaid-based plan on the state
Marketplace.35 The New Mexico state legislature passed a study bill in
201836 that examined four options for a public option based on the state
Medicaid program, but bills introduced the following year to implement the
recommendations of the study failed to pass.37 To date, no Medicaid buy-in
plans have been created, but at least six states have convened task forces to
develop state-level Medicaid buy-in plans and assess their impact on state
insurance markets.38
Notably, as policymakers grapple with the legal and practical difficulties of crafting Medicaid buy-ins, the policy goals and target populations
have diminished, too. What started as a broad idea to provide a public option
to anyone who wanted it and increase coverage options for all has become
more focused on extending coverage to discrete and difficult-to-cover popu-

plan within the Medicaid program and make coverage available for purchase through the plan
to an individual who is not otherwise eligible for Medicaid” and further explaining that “[t]he
office shall apply to the United States Department of Health and Human Services for any
waiver required to implement or administer this chapter” without providing additional details
about how to implement the public option).
34
See Assemb. B. 374, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017); S.B. 405, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.M. 2019).
35
Letter from Brian Sandoval, Governor of Nev., to Hon. Barbara Cegavske, Secretary of
State of Nev. (June 16, 2017) (on file with author) (vetoing Nevada Assembly Bill No. 374 and
providing Governor Sandoval’s reasoning vetoing the bill); see also Michelle Hackman, Nevada’s Governor Vetoes ‘Medicaid for All’ Insurance Plan, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2017), https:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/nevadas-governor-vetoes-medicaid-for-all-insurance-plan-1497701687
[https://perma.cc/4R9X-GKLT].
36
S. Memorial 3, 53rd Leg., 2nd Sess. (N.M. 2018); H. Memorial 9, 53rd Leg., 2nd Sess.
(N.M. 2018); New Mex. House Meas. 9 (2020).
37
See Michael S. Sparer, Redefining the “Public Option”: Lessons from Washington State
and New Mexico, MILBANK MEM’L FUND: MILBANK Q. (2020), https://www.milbank.org/quar
terly/articles/redefining-the-public-option-lessons-from-washington-state-and-new-mexico/
[https://perma.cc/9FWC-UEMG].
38
The six states are Colorado, Delaware, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, and Oregon. See, e.g., PATRICIA BOOZANG, CHIQUITA BROOKS-LASURE & ASHLEY TRAUBE, MEDICAID
BUY-IN: STATE OPTIONS, DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND SECTION 1332 WAIVER IMPLICATIONS
(2018) https://www.shvs.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Medicaid_Buyin_-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JFH2-DY3Y]; STATE OF DELAWARE SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 70
STUDY GROUP, FINAL REPORT (2019), https://news.choosehealthde.com/wp-content/uploads/
2019/01/SCR-70-Medicaid-Buy-In-Study-Group-Final-Report-01.15.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/
L4WB-54D5].
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lations—undocumented immigrants and those who earn too much to qualify
for Medicaid but still find Marketplace coverage unaffordable.
A. Policy Goals
The primary policy goals of Medicaid buy-in plans are: (1) cover the
remaining uninsured; (2) reduce churn between Medicaid and other coverage; and (3) control costs so that residents have an affordable insurance option.39 To cover the remaining uninsured, Medicaid buy-ins typically target
residents with low incomes.40 Fluctuations in household income may alter
eligibility for Medicaid and federal Marketplace subsidies, disrupting the
continuity of care.41 Medicaid buy-ins reduce the destabilizing effects when
enrollees cycle between private and public insurance by allowing individuals
with low incomes to remain in similar plans whether on or off Medicaid.
In addition, Medicaid buy-ins seek to control costs by extending Medicaid’s lower provider reimbursement rates and administrative costs to a
broader patient population.42 These cost-saving measures may make Medicaid buy-ins affordable coverage options for those who cannot currently afford coverage. Consequently, a Medicaid buy-in may be a reasonable choice
for states trying to reach universal coverage by targeting affordable coverage
and state resources to the remaining uninsured.
B. Legal Issues for Medicaid Buy-In
Conceptually, a Medicaid buy-in public option leverages the Medicaid
program to extend coverage to those who are currently ineligible for Medicaid coverage, either by actually enrolling them in the program43 or allowing
purchase of a separate health plan modeled on Medicaid.44 As we explain,
however, statutory constraints make direct enrollment in Medicaid through a
buy-in option by otherwise ineligible populations practically infeasible.
39
For example, Iowa’s bill declares: “[i]t is the intent of the general assembly to establish
a public health care coverage safety net by utilizing a Medicaid program buy-in option to
counteract the effects of inadequate private competition and make affordable health care coverage accessible to those Iowans without individual health care coverage.” H.F. 2002, 87th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018).
40
See infra Section I.C.
41
In 2018, twenty-one percent of uninsured adults reported that they lost health coverage
when a family member lost or changed jobs, and ten percent of uninsured adults reported they
lost Medicaid coverage due to a status change, such as getting married, having a baby, or a
wage increase that made them ineligible. See Jennifer Tolbert, Kendal Orgera & Anthony
Damico, Key Facts about the Uninsured Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/ [https://
perma.cc/WGN7-U9EB].
42
See BOOZANG ET AL., supra note 38, at 11; infra Section I.E.2.
43
See, e.g., Assemb. B. 374, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017) (contemplating a new plan
to be established “within Medicaid”).
44
See, e.g., S.B. 405, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2019) (contemplating a buy-in plan that
“leverages the medicaid coverage structure”).
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The Medicaid statute does not permit states to use federal matching
funds to extend Medicaid eligibility to non-disabled adults or pregnant women with incomes above 138% of the federal poverty limit.45 Section 1115
of the Medicaid statute46 grants the HHS Secretary authority to waive certain
statutory requirements, including group eligibility requirements, through a
demonstration or pilot project.47 In theory, a state might be able to obtain a
Section 1115 waiver to allow non-eligible populations to buy into Medicaid.48 However, for both statutory and practical reasons, states are unlikely
to receive waivers permitting expansion of these programs that would enable
them to draw down federal matching dollars for the buy-in population.
First, federal law bars the use of federal Medicaid funds to pay for nonMedicaid program costs. This prohibition includes using federal Medicaid
dollars for administration or to pay providers for non-Medicaid enrollees.49
As a result, a risk pool that includes both current Medicaid beneficiaries and
those that purchase a Medicaid buy-in would require a Section 1115 waiver
covering the entire state population or whomever the state deems eligible for
the public option. Otherwise, risk pooling or joint oversight of the Medicaid
and public option plans might result in prohibited cross-subsidization between the Medicaid program (and its federal funds) and services for the buyin enrollees.50
Second, CMS policy requires Section 1115 waivers to be budget neutral, meaning federal spending under the waiver cannot exceed what it would
have been in absence of the waiver.51 If the state applies for a Section 1115
waiver to extend Medicaid coverage to a larger portion of state residents
previously ineligible for Medicaid benefits, it would almost certainly increase federal spending even when including modest offsetting savings—
such as a reduction in Marketplace premium tax credits for individuals that
shift from an exchange plan to the Medicaid buy-in option—because the
federal government carries an open-ended responsibility to finance program
expenditures for each Medicaid-covered life.52 Alternatively, a state may
45
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a, 1396b(a)(7); 42 C.F.R. § 433.15(b) (2021); see also Non-Disabled Adults, MACPAC , https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/nondisabled-adults/ [https://
perma.cc/SHX4-B4EK] (last visited Oct. 20, 2021). While states may not expand Medicaid to
non-disabled adults, states have an option to create a Medicaid buy-in program for persons
with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XV), 1396o(g)(1)(A), (B).
46
Social Security Act of 1935 § 1115, 42 U.S.C. § 1315.
47
Eligibility requirements set forth at § 1902 of the Social Security Act may be waived
under Section 1115. Social Security Act of 1935 § 1902, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
48
See Wiley, supra note 16, at 867–68.
49
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a, 1396b(a)(7); 42 C.F.R. § 433.15(b) (2021).
50
See Wiley, supra note 16, at 868.
51
See id.; Letter from Timothy B. Hill, Acting Director of Ctrs. for Medicaid and CHIP
Svcs. on Budget Neutrality Policies for Section 1115(a) Medicaid Demonstration Projects, to
State Medicaid Directors (Aug. 22, 2018) (on file with author).
52
See Sara Rosenbaum, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare: Issues in the Design, Structure, and Administration of Federal Healthcare Financing Programs Supported
Through Direct Public Funding, in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 664, 673 (Brian D. Smedley,
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choose to create a public option plan that allows residents ineligible for
Medicaid to purchase similar coverage using state funds or fully financed by
premiums and cost-sharing without obtaining a Section 1115 waiver.
The third Section 1115 hurdle requires that the demonstration project
promote the goals of the Medicaid program, which courts have interpreted as
providing access to health coverage.53 Presumably, a Medicaid buy-in would
expand access to coverage, but a court could read the purpose more narrowly
to promote coverage for those who cannot afford it, and determine that allowing higher-income populations to buy-in to Medicaid coverage would not
promote Medicaid’s narrower goals of providing medical coverage to lowincome people.54
In sum, it is unlikely that any state could allow additional groups to buy
into Medicaid coverage directly under current Medicaid requirements. Indeed, none of the Medicaid buy-in public option proposals we examined
explicitly contemplates risk-sharing arrangements with the state’s Medicaid
program. Instead, states may offer a separate, Medicaid-like plan, offering
similar benefits, provider networks, and administration for non-Medicaid eligible individuals to purchase on or off the Marketplace.55 Offering a Medicaid-like plan that does not pool risk or share funding with the state’s
existing Medicaid program would not require a Section 1115 waiver.56 Furthermore, by not seeking federal matching funds, the buy-in plan would not
have to comply with all the requirements for Medicaid beneficiaries, such as
strict limits on premiums and cost-sharing and benefits required in Medicaid
(such as non-emergency transportation) that are not typically covered elsewhere.57 Thus, throughout the remainder of this article, when we refer to a
“Medicaid buy-in” plan, we are referring to state proposals that allow nonMedicaid eligible individuals to purchase a plan that is based upon the state’s
Medicaid benefit plan and overseen by the state’s Medicaid agency, rather
than to the direct purchase of Medicaid coverage by individuals ineligible
for Medicaid.

Adrienne Y. Stith, & Alan R. Nelson eds., 2003) (describing the Medicaid program’s structure
and open-ended financing).
53
See, e.g., Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (affirming District Court’s
finding that “the principal objective of Medicaid is providing health care coverage”).
54
See Arkansas Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 275 (2006)
(“The Medicaid program . . . provides joint federal and state funding of medical care for
individuals who cannot afford to pay their own medical costs.”).
55
See, e.g., Nev. Assemb. B. 374, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (2017).
56
See Wiley, supra note 16, at 869.
57
See Jennifer Lav & Héctor Hernández-Delgado, State Medicaid Buy-Ins: Implications
for Low-Income Enrollees, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM 4–5 (Feb. 14, 2018), https://healthlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/MedicaidBuyIns-2.14.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK65YC8Z].
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C. Target Population
Medicaid buy-in plans typically target uninsured state residents who
struggle to find affordable coverage on the Marketplaces and who are ineligible for Medicaid. In states that expanded Medicaid eligibility via the ACA,
the remaining uninsured population includes individuals who earn too much
to qualify for Medicaid, but for whom Marketplace coverage remains unaffordable due to the “family glitch” or the “subsidy cliff” and undocumented
immigrants who are ineligible for coverage through either the Marketplaces
or Medicaid.58 The family glitch refers to the spouses and children of a covered employee who are ineligible for financial subsidies because the employee’s self-only coverage qualifies as affordable. It affects an estimated six
million people.59 The subsidy cliff refers to the abrupt end to federal subsidies for purchasing Marketplace coverage for those who earn more than
400% of FPL.60 To cover those subject to the family glitch or subsidy cliff,
who find existing coverage options unaffordable, states likely need to use
state funds and maximize access to federal funds.
The ACA provides two subsidies applicable to individual plans hosted
on the state and federal Marketplaces—premium tax credits (“PTCs”) and
cost sharing reductions (“CSRs”)—to reduce out-of-pocket health care
spending for low to middle income Americans.61 PTCs reduce premium
costs for individuals with incomes between 100% and 400% of FPL, who
lack access to public programs and affordable employer sponsored insurance.62 In the 2021 American Rescue Plan, Congress increased the generosity of PTCs and expanded availability of PTCs to those earning more than
400% of FPL, limiting premiums to 8.5% of household income, temporarily
eliminating the subsidy cliff.63 Although set to expire at the end of the 2022
plan year, the increased PTC subsidies should increase the pot of money
states may access through Section 1332 waivers.64 CSRs reduce cost-shar-

58
More than sixteen percent of the uninsured population in 2019 were ineligible for Medicaid or federal subsidies to purchase coverage on the Marketplaces due to their immigration
status. Tolbert et al., supra note 41.
59
See 26 C.F.R. § 601.105 (2021) (setting affordability standards for coverage); see also
TRICIA BROOKS, HEALTH AFFS., THE FAMILY GLITCH (2014), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/
10.1377/hpb20141110.62257/full/healthpolicybrief_129.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2XRMWVA].
60
See Jodi Liu & Christine Eibner, Extending Marketplace Tax Credits Would Make Coverage More Affordable for Middle-Income Adults, COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 2017), https://
www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_issue_brief_2017_jul_liu_extending_marketplace_tax_credits_ib.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L7EA-449N].
61
See 26 U.S.C. § 36B; 42 U.S.C. § 18071.
62
See 26 U.S.C. § 36(b)(3)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 18081–18082.
63
See American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117–2, § 9661.
64
See Jason Levits & Daniel Meuse, The American Rescue Plan’s Premium Tax Credit
Expansion—State Policy Considerations, BROOKINGS (Apr. 19, 2021), https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-policy/2021/04/19/what-does-
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ing—deductibles, copays, and coinsurance—for individuals with household
incomes between 100% and 250% of FPL that purchase silver-tiered plans.65
Most Medicaid buy-in bills tailor the eligible population to avoid jeopardizing existing federal funds flowing into the state, and all attempt to maximize federal PTCs to state residents.66 Most Medicaid buy-in bills would
authorize state officials to apply for ACA Section 1332 waivers to allow
residents to use Marketplace PTCs to purchase the state public option plan.67
Some states proposed initially excluding any residents eligible for PTCs
from the Medicaid buy-in plan, while contemplating using federal waivers to
expand eligibility to these residents.68
To cover undocumented immigrants, some bills would specifically allow any resident to purchase the Medicaid buy-in plan and broadly defined
“resident” to include undocumented immigrants.69 However, the political
opposition to the use of state money to subsidize insurance for the state’s
undocumented immigrants70 may partly explain why these bills have not yet
passed and why some state proposals took the opposite approach and specifically excluded undocumented immigrants from the Medicaid buy-in.
The Medicaid buy-in proposals further diverge on whether to permit
those with private, employer-based insurance to enroll. To avoid crowding
out employer sponsored coverage,71 New Mexico and West Virginia would
not allow residents to purchase the public option if they have been denied or
disenrolled from employer-sponsored coverage on the basis that they would
qualify for the public option.72 Massachusetts, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming take a different approach by allowing employers to purchase public
option coverage on behalf of their employees.73
the-american-rescue-plans-premium-tax-credit-expansion-and-the-uncertainty-around-it-meanfor-state-health-policy/ [https://perma.cc/RV6Z-VNBQ].
65
See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d); 42 U.S.C. § 18071(b)–(c).
66
For example, Georgia’s bill would have required the department to design the public
option “in a manner that prioritizes affordability for enrollees and provides opportunities to
maximize federal dollars.” S.B. 339, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2020).
67
See, e.g., H.B. 1132, 191st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019). For a discussion of the
requirements for ACA Section 1332 waivers for plans on the Exchange, see infra Section
II.B.2.
68
See S.B. 405, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2019); H.B. 4789, 84th Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess.
§ 9-4F-2 (W. Va. 2020).
69
See, e.g., H.B. 4789, 84th Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. § 9-4F-2 (W. Va. 2020); Ga. S.B. 339;
H.B. 2009, 81st Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); cf. H.B. 5463, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Conn. 2018).
70
See Sparer, supra note 37, at 269; see, e.g., Ass. Bill 449, 2017 Leg., Gen. Assemb.,
(Wis. 2017) (limiting enrollment to individuals with incomes above the maximum limit “who
otherwise meet the eligibility requirements” of the Medicaid program).
71
See Gestur Davidson, Lynn A. Blewett & Kathleen Thiede Call, Public Program
Crowd-Out of Private Coverage: What Are the Issues?, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND.
(2004), https://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2004/06/public-program-crowd-out-of-private-coverage.html [https://perma.cc/5ASQ-5FZ8].
72
See H.B. 416, 54th Leg., 1st Sess., (N.M. 2019); W. Va. H.B. 4789.
73
See, e.g., H.B. 1132, 191st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019) (“[A]ny optional expanded plan offered to an employer shall require the employer to pay not less than 50 per cent
of the projected cost of coverage for participating employees.”).
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In short, the target populations of the Medicaid buy-in bills resemble a
patchwork, driven by design considerations such as minimizing disruption to
employer-based coverage or maximizing federal dollars flowing to state residents. Nonetheless, the common target population for all of these plans
remains low-income residents who are ineligible for Medicaid and remain
unable to find affordable coverage.
D. Administration of Medicaid Buy-In Plans
One of the most appealing features of Medicaid buy-in plans is that
they allow states to build on the existing administrative framework of the
state Medicaid program to offer comprehensive benefits at a relatively low
cost and leverage the program’s existing provider network and contractual
arrangements. As such, all of the Medicaid buy-in bills task the state Medicaid agency with oversight of the public option. In most states, the Medicaid
agency has experience contracting with managed care plans to administer
benefits, which makes the Medicaid program an attractive choice for many
states when trying to deliver a new state-based plan. Once a state has opted
for a Medicaid buy-in, more decisions follow, such as whether to offer the
plan on the Marketplace and administer it publicly or privately.
1. On or Off the Marketplace
The decision about whether to offer the plan on the Marketplace is
driven by the policy goals and target population that the state seeks to cover
with the Medicaid buy-in. All fourteen Medicaid buy-in bills we reviewed
would allow the state official overseeing the plan to sell it on the Marketplace if all necessary federal waivers were granted.74 Offering the Medicaid
buy-in on the Marketplace is necessary if a state wants to capture federal
Marketplace PTCs and increase options on the Marketplace. In addition,
many states use the state-based Marketplace to determine eligibility for
Medicaid coverage,75 so offering the Medicaid buy-in plan on the Marketplace makes it easier for individuals to enroll in the appropriate plan and
reduces the effects of churn.
If a state wants to use a Medicaid buy-in to cover undocumented immigrants, however, then the public option plan cannot be offered solely on the
Marketplace.76 Further, offering a Medicaid buy-in plan on the Marketplace
limits design flexibility, as it must receive QHP certification.77 Furthermore,
74

See, e.g., H.F. 2002, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 3 §§ 1(a), 2(2) (Iowa 2018).
See Medicaid and Health Insurance Marketplace Coordination, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/medicaid-and-health-insurance-marketplacecoordination/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,
%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/2AKQ-W8J4] (last updated Jan. 1, 2021).
76
See infra Section II.B.
77
See 42 U.S.C. § 18021 (codifying Section 1301 of the ACA, which sets forth requirements of a QHP); infra Section II.B.1.
75
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the guaranteed issue requirements for Marketplace plans78 would prevent a
state from limiting eligibility for the public option to low-income residents,
as contemplated by Oregon.79
With the legal and political uncertainties surrounding the choice to offer
the Medicaid buy-in on the Marketplace, states may want to preserve flexibility by allowing the plan to be sold both on and off the Marketplace, but
also be prepared to change course if unanticipated consequences, such as
adverse selection, occur.80
2. Public or Private Administration
States can contract with private entities to administer Medicaid buy-in
plans, or they can do so internally. States that deliver Medicaid benefits
through private managed care plans can build on existing infrastructure and
procurement processes to contract with Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (“MCOs”) to offer similar plans to non-Medicaid enrollees. In the
thirty-eight states that use MCOs to manage Medicaid benefits, the state typically pays a fixed amount per member, and the MCO assumes financial risk
for providing health care services for the covered beneficiary.81 If the MCO
kept the Medicaid plans, risk pools, administration, and financing separate
from the Medicaid buy-in plans, the state would not need a Section 1115
waiver.82
Conversely, if a state Medicaid agency directly administers the buy-in
plan alongside Medicaid coverage, the state may be able to streamline administrative functions and generate cost-savings through economies of scale
and bulk purchasing power. However, the Medicaid agency may not use
federal Medicaid funds to administer the Medicaid buy-in plan (absent a
Section 1115 waiver), rendering truly integrated administration difficult to
attain.83 The agency’s ability to use joint purchasing arrangements for
pharmaceuticals for the Medicaid buy-in plan by leveraging the combined

78

See infra Section II.B.1.
See H.B. 2009, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1(3) (Or. 2019).
80
See H.B. 5463, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2018) (requiring the Commissioner of Social Services, the Office of Health Strategy, and the Health Care Cabinet to study
whether the state should apply for waivers, charge copayments and deductibles, and sell the
public option plan on the Marketplace as a QHP).
81
See Isaac Buck, Managing Medicaid, 11 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 107,
110–11 (2017); Wiley, supra note 17, at 850; Medicaid and Managed Care – Policy Brief,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 30, 1995), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-andmanaged-care-policy-brief [https://perma.cc/FWH9-6X7M].
82
See Wiley, supra note 16, at 869–70 (“In states that have largely privatized Medicaid,
the most natural approach would be to develop a public option that relies on the state’s infrastructure for Medicaid managed care contracts, but is otherwise separate from Medicaid. . . .
[T]he impact on Medicaid could be negligible and a waiver may be unnecessary.”).
83
See U.S.C. §§ 1396a, 1396b(a)(7); 42 C.F.R. 433.15(b) (2021).
79
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populations of the Medicaid buy-in plan and the Medicaid program, however, remains promising.84
Of the thirteen states that considered bills to create a Medicaid buy-in,
eleven currently use MCOs to manage at least a portion of their Medicaid
program.85 Administration of a Medicaid buy-in through existing Medicaid
MCOs was the predominant approach. Among these, bills in Georgia, Oregon, and Wisconsin would require MCOs to administer the public option in
contract with the state Medicaid agency,86 while bills in Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, and West Virginia would allow the director to offer the
program through MCOs.87 However, Medicaid MCOs have mixed performance in cost savings,88 which likely explains why Iowa proposed requiring its
Medicaid agency to establish and administer the Medicaid buy-in plan in
addition to terminating all of its existing MCO contracts.89 To avoid violating
federal funding restrictions, the Iowa bill would require the Iowa Medicaid
agency to obtain any necessary Section 1115 waivers.90 In sum, a state’s
prior experience with Medicaid MCOs will likely determine whether it
chooses to administer a Medicaid buy-in internally or via private carriers.
E. Financial Considerations
1. Financing Sources
In addition to administration, policymakers must determine how to pay
for Medicaid buy-in plans. Medicaid buy-in plans are primarily funded
through enrollee premiums and cost-sharing.91 For Medicaid buy-ins offered
on the Marketplace, federal subsidies, such as PTC and CSR payments, can
also help fund the plan.92 Relying only on individual and federal funds
makes the Medicaid buy-in plan more politically palatable and keeps the
plan budget-neutral to the state, allowing it to comply with state balanced84

See infra text accompanying notes 91–92.
Connecticut and Wyoming do not use Medicaid MCOs.
86
See Ga. S.B. 339 (2020); Or. H.B. 2009 (2019); Assemb. B. 449, 2017–2018 Legis.
(Wisc. 2017). Oregon uses coordinated care organizations to manage their Medicaid program.
87
See Nev. Assemb. B. 374 (2017); N.M. H.B. 416 (2019); W. Va. H.B. 4789 (2020).
88
See Michael S. Sparer, Medicaid Managed Care, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND.
(Sept. 4, 2012), https://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2012/09/medicaid-managedcare.html [https://perma.cc/FCE4-M7E8]; see also Jeff C. Goldsmith, David Mosley & Anne
Jacobs, Medicaid Managed Care: Lots of Unanswered Questions (Part 2), HEALTH AFFS.
(May 4, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180430.510086/full/ [https://
perma.cc/D3C3-JKCH].
89
See H.F. 2002, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Iowa 2018).
90
Id. § 2-(2)(b).
91
See, e.g., N.M. S.B. 405 (2019) (“The department shall . . . set the total amount of
premiums that should be assessed to [M]edicaid buy-in plan enrollees, after an actuarial analysis, to ensure maximum access to coverage. Premiums imposed may be set at a level sufficient to offset the costs of health benefits under the [M]edicaid buy-in plan and related
administrative costs.”).
92
See supra text accompanying notes 54–56.
85
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budget requirements.93 However, the remaining uninsured population that
many states seek to cover through a Medicaid buy-in are uninsured because
they are ineligible for Medicaid coverage or sufficient PTCs to afford Marketplace coverage. So, the key financing challenge remains: how to reach
low-income residents who aren’t eligible for federal subsidies? In particular,
states must decide whether to use state funds to subsidize costs for lower
income residents.
Of the Medicaid buy-in plans, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Oregon, and
Wyoming require the state to set premiums intended to cover the actuarial
value of the health services provided,94 while New Mexico and West Virginia require the public option to offer financial assistance through discounted premiums and reduced cost-sharing fees to residents with household
incomes below 200% of FPL.95 To offer this financial assistance, the bills
from New Mexico and West Virginia establish non-reverting funds in the
state treasury, but do not specify how the states will raise the necessary
funds.96 As states have few federal funding sources to help cover the remaining uninsured, tensions exist between state coverage goals and financial
realities.
2. Cost Control
Expanding the availability of coverage to the uninsured makes cost
containment a central concern of any public option plan. States have primarily sought to restrain provider payment rates to limit public option premiums. Medicaid buy-in plans would base provider rates on those paid by the
Medicaid program.97 Medicaid pays the lowest provider rates of all payers—
less than Medicare and far below private insurance plans.98 While the tradi93
See Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 YALE L.J.F. 1, 10
(2017) (noting that the states, unlike the federal government, cannot deficit-spend to cover
health care costs in times of revenue contraction); Sparer, supra note 37, at 269.
94
See, e.g., H.B. 1132, 191st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. § 1(b) (Mass. 2019); S.F. 133, 2019
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 42-4-123(b) (Wyo. 2018).
95
See H.B. 4789, 84th Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. § 9-4F-4 (W. Va. 2020) (requiring the department administering the plan to “establish an affordability scale for premiums and other costsharing fees . . . based on household income. The department shall offer discounted premiums
and cost-sharing fees . . . provided, that the financial assistance is, at a minimum, offered to
residents with household incomes below 200% of the federal poverty level.”); N.M. H.B. 416
(offering state-funded premium subsidies to residents earning at or below 200% of FPL).
96
See N.M. S.B. 405 (2019) § 6(B); W.Va. H.B. 4789 (2020).
97
See W. Va. H.B. 4789 § 9-4F-3(f); N.M. H.B. 416 § 4(F) (“Health care provider reimbursement rates shall be based on the Medicaid fee schedule[.]”); see also Michael Ollove,
Medicaid ‘Buy-In’ Could Be a New Health Care Option for the Uninsured, PEW: STATELINE
(Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/01/
10/medicaid-buy-in-could-be-a-new-health-care-option-for-the-uninsured [https://perma.cc/
GGN8-YSQ9].
98
See Thomas M. Selden, Zeynal Karaca, Patricia Keenan, Chapin White & Richard
Kronick, The Growing Difference Between Public and Private Payment Rates for Inpatient
Hospital Care, 34 HEALTH AFFS. 2147, 2147 (2015). While Medicaid rates for specific services rendered overall are about fifty-five percent of Medicaid payments to hospitals, other
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tional Medicaid fee schedule is administratively set by each state and not
subject to negotiation by providers, Medicaid MCOs typically negotiate payment rates for providers that participate in their network within established
state restrictions, including minimum payment rates for providers in some
categories.99 Most of the Medicaid buy-in bills do not specify reimbursement
rates, and even when they reference Medicaid rates, the buy-in plan could
conceivably pay a higher multiple of Medicaid rates, such as 150% of current rates. Most states contemplate higher reimbursement rates when possible, but offer few specifics in the bills about how to accomplish that goal.100
In addition to controlling costs through provider reimbursement rates,
some states also consider mechanisms to control prescription drug costs. The
New Mexico and West Virginia bills, for example, allow the health services
department to contract with other entities or states to combine purchasing
power and seek federal authority to create a wholesale drug importation program.101 Georgia’s bill requires the state Medicaid agency to “establish a
method for procuring prescription drugs consistent with the manner utilized
for Medicaid,”102 but the bill does not specify whether that would include
extending the Medicaid best price rule to the state public option.
Medicaid buy-in plans must walk a fine line with cost-control. On the
one hand, extending Medicaid provider reimbursement rates to the buy-in
population holds the greatest promise for making premiums more affordable.
On the other hand, if states set provider reimbursement rates too low, providers may drop out of the public option or Medicaid programs, creating unintended effects on the private insurance market.

supplemental payments, including disproportionate share hospital payment, upper payment
limit, uncompensated care pool payments, and delivery system reform incentive payments,
mean that Medicaid payments to hospitals on par with Medicare. See MEDICAID BASE AND
SUPPLEMENTAL PAYMENTS TO HOSPITALS (2020), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/03/Medicaid-Base-and-Supplemental-Payments-to-Hospitals.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UYG8-SBFZ]; Fact Sheet: Underpayment by Medicare and Medicaid, AHA (Jan.
2021), https://www.aha.org/fact-sheets/2020-01-07-fact-sheet-underpayment-medicare-andmedicaid [https://perma.cc/R9VG-T86T]. The public option bills we studied are silent on
whether Medicaid buy-in public option payments would be based on an aggregate Medicaid
payment rate or on the fee for service schedule.
99
See 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(13); KATHLEEN GIFFORD, EILEEN ELLIS, AIMEE LASHBROOK &
MIKE NARDONE, KAISER FAM. FOUND., A VIEW FROM THE STATES: KEY MEDICAID POLICY
CHANGES: RESULTS FROM A 50-STATE MEDICAID BUDGET SURVEY FOR STATE FISCAL YEARS
2019 AND 2020 70 (2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-A-View-from-the-States-KeyMedicaid-Policy-Changes [https://perma.cc/MC7E-CFXD] (noting that nearly half (nineteen)
of MCO states reported mandating minimum provider reimbursement rates in their MCO
contract).
100
For instance, Connecticut requires and Massachusetts allows excess funds to be used to
increase reimbursement rates for providers. See R.B. 5463, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
§§ 3, 4 (Conn. 2018); H.B. 1132, 191st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. § 1(b) (Mass. 2019).
101
See N.M. S.B. 405 § 5(C)(4) (2019); W. Va. H.B. 4789 (2020).
102
See Ga. S.B. 339 (2020).
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F. Market Effects
One of the most difficult design considerations for policy makers seeking to implement a Medicaid buy-in is identifying and minimizing adverse
effects on existing markets. In particular, a public option with payments
pegged to Medicaid rates has the potential to destabilize both provider and
insurance markets and reduce access. Some federal public option proposals
would require providers to accept the public option in order to participate in
Medicare and Medicaid,103 and a state could require any provider that accepts Medicaid patients or Marketplace plans to accept the public option
plan.104 In many markets, however, Medicaid MCOs already struggle to recruit sufficient providers,105 and if large portions of state residents are covered by a plan that uses Medicaid rates, providers may leave the state. Not
only would this harm enrollment in the Medicaid buy-in, but it could have
deleterious effects on access to providers by actual Medicaid enrollees.
Disruptions to the insurance market are more ambiguous. A Medicaid
buy-in plan that undercuts premiums for private plans on the Marketplace
could slow premium growth—a good disruption—but it could also reduce
consumers’ choices if private insurance carriers and providers leave the market.106 Nonetheless, private insurer exit may not be a problem so long as
sufficient providers participate—in fact, this may be the goal of a public
option.107 A cheaper, comprehensive Medicaid buy-in could also cause adverse selection between Marketplace plans and the Medicaid buy-in if the
public option disproportionately attracts individuals with high health care
costs. In this case, the premiums calculated by the state will not be sufficient
to cover expenditures. The ACA helps mitigate this risk by applying risk
adjustment to Marketplace plans and by requiring insurers to place all indi-

103
See Tricia Neuman, Karen Pollitz, Jennifer Tolbert, Robin Rudowitz & Wyatt Koma, 10
Key Questions on Public Option Proposals, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 18, 2019), https://
www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/10-key-questions-on-public-option-proposals/ [https://
perma.cc/ES3Y-2TNS].
104
See MATTHEW FIEDLER, USC BROOKINGS-SCHAEFFER INITIATIVE FOR HEALTH POL’Y,
CAPPING PRICES OR CREATING A PUBLIC OPTION: HOW WOULD THEY CHANGE WHAT WE PAY
FOR HEALTH CARE 10 (2020).
105
See RACHEL GARFIELD, ELIZABETH HINTON, ELIZABETH CORNACHIONE & CORNELIA
HALL, KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID MANAGED CARE PLANS AND ACCESS TO CARE: RESULTS FROM THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 2017 SURVEY OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE
PLANS 7 (2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Medicaid-Managed-Care-March-Plansand-Access-to-Care [https://perma.cc/YSG6-BYJT] (finding eighty percent of Medicaid MCO
plans report difficulty in finding adult or pediatric subspecialists and forty percent report difficulty in recruiting primary care physicians).
106
See CHIQUITA BROOKS-LASURE, APRIL GRADY, ASHLY TRAUBE & PATRICIA BOOZANG,
MANATT HEALTH, QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF A TARGETED MEDICAID BUY-IN FOR NEW
MEXICO 16 (2019), https://www.manatt.com/Manatt/media/Documents/Articles/Final-NewMexico-Buy-In-Phase-2-Paper-1-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6PT-HSS5] (arguing that offering
a Medicaid-like QHP on the Marketplace could decrease competition if private insurers struggle to compete with lower-cost options and exit the market).
107
See Hoffman, supra note 17, at 12.
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vidual plan enrollees, both on and off the Marketplace, in one risk pool.108
Therefore, Medicaid buy-in plans offered on and off the Marketplace would
presumably participate in risk-adjustment.109 A legislatively authorized study
analyzing four options for a proposed Medicaid buy-in in New Mexico suggested that offering two plans—one a QHP on the Marketplace and one off
the Marketplace targeting those impacted by the family glitch or immigration status—could minimize disruptions to the state Marketplace because
they could be implemented in the same ACA risk pool.110
At first glance, Medicaid buy-in plans are an appealing vehicle for a
public option because they build on existing infrastructure, offer comprehensive benefits, control costs by importing Medicaid’s low provider rates and
administrative costs, and come with significant federal funding. The reality,
however, is much more constrained and complicated. To comply with the
legal constraints of the Medicaid statute and the Affordable Care Act, a state
must contort and narrow a Medicaid buy-in, significantly diminishing its
resemblance to actual Medicaid. In implementing Medicaid buy-ins, states
will likely require Medicaid-managed care plans to offer a separate but similar plan on and off the ACA Marketplaces to allow those eligible for PTCs to
use them to purchase the plan, and those who are ineligible (like undocumented immigrants) to purchase a similar plan outside the Marketplace. For
legal and practical reasons, the benefits, premiums, cost-sharing, provider
reimbursement, and plan design would look more like a Marketplace plan
than a Medicaid plan. Thus, the scale of innovation and the scope of increased coverage would probably be modest. Viable Medicaid buy-ins are
small-bore public option plans. Perhaps this is why the first states to actually
implement a public option follow the next model we review, the Marketplace-based public option plan.
II. MARKETPLACE-BASED PUBLIC OPTIONS
Marketplace-based public options (“MBPOs”) offer states the opportunity to provide affordable, comprehensive coverage to large portions of the
population, while generating competition on the ACA Marketplace and
bringing federal funds into the state to support health care expenses. MBPOs
are health insurance plans that satisfy ACA Marketplace specifications, including state QHP certification, and also conform to coverage, provider payment, and other specifications established by the state for the public option.
We examined twenty-one MBPO bills across ten states introduced between
108

See 42 U.S.C. § 18032.
See CORI E. UCCELLO, AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, EXPANDING ACCESS TO PUBLIC INSURANCE PLANS 9 (2019), https://www.actuary.org/sites/default/files/files/publications/Public
InsurancePlans.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P6V-F9GY].
110
See BROOKS-LASURE ET AL., supra note 107, at 14.
109
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2010 and 2021, including three in Washington, Colorado, and Nevada that
were signed into law.111 MBPOs’ largest advantage in comparison to other
public option plans is the opportunity to capitalize on the federal subsidies,
in the form of PTCs and CSRs. MBPO plans also face fewer legal constraints than Medicaid buy-ins.
A. Policy Goals
As the most flexible public option model, state MBPOs can take a variety of forms depending on the state’s policy goals. States can design MBPOs
to meet any of the policy goals of a public option, including increasing affordability, reducing churn, providing near-universal coverage untethered to
employment (with notable exceptions), increasing competition and market
function, and simplifying administration.
Nearly all states contemplating a public option hope to offer comprehensive and affordable coverage, while controlling or reducing health care
spending.112 The Colorado legislature stated that the purpose of the public
option plan was to “increas[e] the availability of affordable health insurance
statewide to any resident seeking coverage in the individual market[.]”113
States hope MBPOs will control health spending by reducing provider payments to below commercial rates through price caps,114 lowering administrative expenses,115 and generating price competition within the Marketplace to
drive down commercial plan rates.116
Beyond affordability, states have proposed MBPOs to achieve additional policy goals. For instance, Massachusetts and Illinois sought to
achieve universal coverage and serve as a glide path to a public single payer
by offering MBPO coverage to enrollees in the individual, small group, and
large group markets.117 As noted above, MBPOs can also reduce the harms
of churning on and off Medicaid by ensuring that people can keep their
doctors even if their plan technically changes.118 Finally, states seeking to
improve market function and enhance patient choice can create an MBPO to

111
See Appendix A. Washington enacted its public option in 2019, and Colorado and
Nevada enacted theirs in 2021. See S.B. 5526, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); H.B.
21-1232, 73rd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021); S.B. 420, 2021 Leg., 81st Reg. Sess.
(Nev. 2021).
112
See, e.g., Wash. S.B. 5526; Raised B. 346, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. § 2(a)
(Conn. 2020).
113
Colo. H.B. 20-1349 § 10-16-1202(2)(a).
114
See, e.g., Wash. S.B. 5526 § 3(2)(g)(i) (limiting the total reimbursement amount for all
covered benefits to 160% of Medicare reimbursement for the same or similar services in the
statewide aggregate).
115
See, e.g., Conn. Raised B. 346 § 2(2) (establishing a medical loss ratio of ninety
percent).
116
See, e.g., Colo. H.B. 20-1349 § 10-16-1205(2)(a)(II)(A).
117
See S.B. 697, 191st Gen. Ct., 2019–2020 Sess. § 3 (Mass. 2019); H.B. 5733, 98th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 20 (Ill. 2014).
118
See supra Section I.A.
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provide coverage in “bare counties” without any plan offerings, generate
competition in areas with minimal existing offerings, and provide consumers
and employers more affordable coverage options.119 The structure of any
state MBPO will depend on ACA requirements for all plans offered on the
Marketplace as well as the particular needs and policy goals of the state.
B. Legal Issues for Marketplace-Based Public Option Plans
The ACA creates significant financial incentives for states to offer a
public option on the Marketplace, but it also imposes requirements on those
plans, some of which may be altered via a Section 1332 waiver from HHS.
1. ACA Marketplace Requirements
To access federal Marketplace subsidies, Marketplace-based plans must
satisfy the requirements of the ACA. The Marketplaces offer competing
health insurance plans with standardized minimum benefits and coverage
levels to simplify and facilitate consumer plan selection. Any public option
plan offered on the Marketplace must meet the ACA’s guaranteed issue120
and modified community rating provisions,121 which require plans to accept
all individuals and charge them the same premium as other similarly-situated
individuals, regardless of health status.122 Further, all plans offered on the
Marketplace must be QHPs,123 which means they must: (1) be offered by a
health insurance issuer in the state that is licensed, in good standing, and has
agreed to the requirements for offering a plan on the Marketplace; (2) cover
all of the Essential Health Benefits (“EHBs”); and (3) be certified for sale
on the Marketplace.124 The ACA also mandates compliance with federal
medical loss ratio (“MLR”) limits, which require Marketplace plans to
spend at least eighty percent of individual and small group premium revenue
to provide health care to patients, or return the difference to enrollees.125
Each of these requirements aims to ensure meaningful access to comprehensive and affordable health care coverage, therefore many of them, such as
the EHBs and MLR, a state would likely include in the design of a public
option plan even in the absence of the ACA requirements.

119
See, e.g., Colo. H.B. 20-1349 § 10-16-1205(1)(a)–(b) (requiring commercial plans to
offer the Colorado Option Plan in the individual market in each county where the carrier offers
an individual plan and requiring the commissioner to ensure that there are at least two carriers
that offer the Colorado option plan in each county in the state); see also S.B. 5526, 66th Leg.,
2019 Reg. Sess. § 1(1)–(2)(a) (Wash. 2019); Mass. S.B. 697 § 3; Ill. H.B. 5733 § 20.
120
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–1.
121
See id. § 300gg.
122
See id. The ACA’s modified community rating provision allows health plans to vary
premiums based on geographic area, age (up to 3x), and tobacco usage (up to 1.5x). See id.
123
See id. § 18021; 45 C.F.R. § 155.1000 (2021).
124
See 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1).
125
See id. § 300gg-18.
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Yet, the specificity of some requirements can affect a state’s design of
its MBPO plan. For instance, most states do not have an existing state entity
that qualifies as a licensed health insurance issuer. Federal regulations define
a health insurance issuer as an “insurance company, insurance service, or
insurance organization (including an HMO) that is required to be licensed to
engage in the business of insurance in a State and that is subject to State law
that regulates insurance . . . .”126 Therefore, to offer a plan on the Marketplace, states will need to have existing commercial carriers offer the public
option plans on the Marketplace,127 modify the eligibility requirements for
Marketplace certification,128 or grant an existing state agency the authority to
offer plans as QHPs on the Marketplace.129 A state agency seeking the authority to issue QHPs must ensure that each QHP complies with federal and
state benefit design standards, remain licensed and in good standing with the
State, implement quality improvement strategies, and satisfy the necessary
reporting requirements established by the ACA.130
Once a state has established a licensed health insurance issuer for the
MBPO, the plan must be certified by the Marketplace as a QHP.131 Many of
the certification requirements involve benefit design, including covering the
EHBs.132
Second, a QHP must also offer coverage of a specific actuarial value,
which establishes the percentage of health care costs the plan will cover for a
standard population. Plans offered on the Marketplace are divided into four
metal tiers based on their actuarial value:133 Bronze (60%); Silver (70%);
Gold (80%); and Platinum (90%).134 Issuers that offer plans on the Marketplace must offer at least one QHP at the silver level and one at the gold level
in each service area in which it offers coverage on the Marketplace.135 However, issuers do not have to offer plans in all counties in a state or at all four

126

45 C.F.R. § 144.103 (2021).
See, e.g., S.B. 5526, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. § 3 (Wash. 2019).
128
See S.B. 697, 191st Gen. Ct., 2019–2020 Sess. § 4 (Mass. 2019) (modifying Chapter
176Q § 5(a) to read: “Only health insurance plans and stand-alone vision or stand-alone dental
plans that have been approved by the commissioner and underwritten by a carrier, as well as
the public health insurance option, may be offered through the connector.”).
129
See S.F. 2302, 91st Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. § 14(1)(d) (Minn. 2019) (stating that the
Dep’t of Human Services is deemed to meet and receive certification and authority as a managed care organization).
130
See 45 C.F.R. § 156.200(b) (2021).
131
Id. § 156.200(a).
132
See 42 U.S.C. § 18022. The ten categories of EHBs include ambulatory patient services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance use disorder services, prescription drugs, rehabilitation and habilitation services,
laboratory services, preventive and wellness services, and pediatric services. Id.; 45 C.F.R.
§ 156.110(a) (2021).
133
See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d); see also What the Actuarial Values in the Affordable Care
Act Mean, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 1, 2011), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/
what-the-actuarial-values-in-the-affordable/ [https://perma.cc/Q7US-6EV9].
134
See 45 U.S.C. § 18022(d); 45 C.F.R. § 156.140 (2021).
135
See 45 C.F.R. § 156.200(c) (2021).
127
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levels of coverage, which can create significant geographic and financial
gaps in coverage that states may want to address through the creation of
MBPOs.
Finally, states can impose their own requirements on health plans offered on the Marketplace via state insurance laws and QHP certification requirements. All states have insurance laws that require plans offered in the
state to meet criteria for licensure, including mandatory benefits and maintaining and reporting financial reserves. States operating their own Marketplaces can impose conditions on QHP certification, including requiring
issuers selling plans on the Marketplace to offer the MBPO.136 On the other
hand, states with a federally-facilitated Marketplace have less flexibility to
impose individual state conditions on issuers because the federal Marketplace has historically certified plans in a unified manner.137
Overall, states seeking to create an MBPO will need to design their
public option plans to satisfy both federal ACA requirements and state insurance laws. Nevertheless, states may apply for a Section 1332 waiver from
HHS to deviate from ACA requirements.
2. Deviations from ACA Requirements: Section 1332 Waivers
To offer an MBPO that deviates from ACA requirements, states can
apply for a State Innovation Waiver under ACA Section 1332, which allows
them to adapt plans offered on the Marketplace to address their specific
needs and to try innovative strategies. Section 1332 permits states to waive
or modify certain requirements for ACA Marketplace plans, including: the
individual and employer mandates, EHB requirements, the definition of a
QHP, limits on cost sharing for covered benefits, metal coverage tiers, health
insurance Marketplace standards and requirements, PTCs, and CSRs.138
For example, the ACA’s employer mandate requires large employers to
offer “minimum essential coverage” to their employees or pay a penalty.139
The penalty is triggered for every full-time employee that receives a PTC to
purchase coverage on the Marketplace, instead of using employer coverage.140 This provision may need to be waived if the MBPO were offered to
large employers, to ensure the MBPO counts as minimum essential coverage

136

See id. § 156.200(d); see, e.g., S.B. 5526, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. § 1(2)(a) (Wash.

2019).
137
See Waivers for State Innovation, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,131, 78,135 (Dec. 16, 2015) (“Until
further guidance is issued, the Federal platform cannot accommodate different rules for different states.”). CMS’s 2018 guidance notes that technical enhancements may support some variation and flexibility for states using the federal Marketplace to try models through use of
Section 1332 waivers. See State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 83 Fed. Reg. 53,575,
53,581 (Oct. 24, 2018).
138
See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(1).
139
See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)–(c).
140
See id.
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and to prevent employers from being penalized if employees choose the
MBPO.
The ACA, however, imposes significant requirements on states seeking
a Section 1332 waiver: they must pass legislation permitting the state to seek
such a waiver and comply with strict guardrails when proposing changes to
ACA requirements.141 For instance, the proposed plan must not reduce the
comprehensiveness of benefits, increase cost sharing, or cover fewer residents than would be covered absent the waiver.142 Furthermore, the proposal must not increase the federal deficit, which means that the projected
federal spending with the waiver must be equal to or less than the projected
spending without the waiver.143 Numerous factors can affect the federal revenue and net federal spending, including changes to federal income, payroll
or excise tax revenue, premium tax credits, small business credits, employer
shared responsibility payments, Medicaid spending and other forms of federal assistance, and administrative costs.144
Needless to say, designing a plan modification that can meet these requirements, passing legislation, and submitting a Section 1332 waiver can be
onerous for states, and HHS has considerable discretion to deny the waiver,
even those that successfully meet these criteria.145 Faced with these challenges and uncertainties, states wishing to deviate from the ACA requirements may consider offering their public option plan off the Marketplace to
avoid the Section 1332 waiver process.
However, Congress created strong incentives for states to innovate
within the ACA structure by offering federal pass-through funding to states
that receive Section 1332 waivers.146 If the state reduces the costs of Marketplace plans through Section 1332 innovation, the federal government will
pass any savings it incurred from reductions in federal ACA assistance, including PTCs, CSRs, and small business credits, back to the state.147 States
can use the federal pass-through funding to help fund their new state plan. In
particular, states may use pass-through funds to increase subsidies for individuals earning above 400% of FPL (the cutoff for federal ACA subsidies)
and limit the percentage of income enrollees spend on health care.148 How141

See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(b)(2).
See id. § 18052(b)(1)(A)–(C).
143
See id. § 18052(b)(1)(D) (stating that waivers cannot increase the deficit during the
waiver term (up to 5 years) or in total over the ten-year budget plan); State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.1300–155.1328 (2021).
144
See Waivers for State Innovation, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,131, 78,133 (Dec. 16, 2015) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R § 155 (2021)); State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 83 Fed. Reg.
53,575 (Oct. 24, 2018).
145
See Waivers for State Innovation, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,131, 78,133 (Dec. 16, 2015).
146
See 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (a)(3).
147
See id. The pass-through savings does not include any savings other than the reductions
in federal assistance provided by the ACA. See State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 45
C.F.R. § 155 (2021).
148
See, e.g., Raised S.B. 346, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. § 2(a)(4)(B) (Conn. 2020)
(offering cost-sharing subsidies to public option plan enrollees who are ineligible to receive
142
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ever, states must be mindful that the federal government will reduce passthrough savings by losses in federal revenue arising from the waiver to ensure deficit neutrality.149 The promise of federal money to subsidize health
reform may provide powerful motivation for states that must balance their
budgets to obtain a Section 1332 waiver for their public option plans.
When designing MBPOs, states must scaffold around ACA requirements as they seek to fulfill their goals for target population, plan administration, financing, and market impact. State goals and priorities can affect
the design, legal, and financial implications of offering various MBPO models on the Marketplaces.
C. Target Population
MBPOs primarily target populations that seek individual or small group
coverage through the ACA Marketplace, although some MBPOs would also
allow large groups to participate. Unlike Medicaid buy-in models, states
have less ability to offer MBPO plans directly to a specific target population.
Instead, at a minimum, MBPO plans must be offered to any eligible individual in a particular geographic area, which generally includes all lawfully
present residents who are not incarcerated.150 As a result, states cannot limit
plan eligibility to individuals that make below certain income levels. They
can, however, use financial incentives, such as enhanced subsidies, to encourage certain individuals to enroll in the public option.151 For example,
Washington, aiming to prevent individuals from spending more than ten percent of their income on individual coverage, would require state authorities
to develop a plan to offer state-sponsored premium subsidies for individuals
earning up to 500% of FPL who purchase individual coverage on the exchange.152 States, in their capacity as employers, can also use automatic enrollment of public employees to expand the plan’s risk pool and purchasing
power.153
States can also target citizens of specific geographic areas by offering
or requiring commercial insurers to offer MBPO plans in areas that currently
lack coverage or have minimal coverage in the Marketplace. To address the
fact that twenty-two counties had only one plan offered on the Marketplace,
CSRs offered by the ACA); S.B. 5526, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. § 6(1) (Wash. 2019) (increasing subsidies to those earning up to 500% of FPL and limiting individual premium spending to ten percent of adjusted gross income). Both Connecticut’s and Washington’s proposals
would require Section 1332 waivers to use federal pass-through funds and vary the ACA rules
in this way.
149
For instance, if the Section 1332 waivers result in lower federal tax revenue or higher
Medicaid enrollment, the amount of pass-through savings offered back to the state will be
offset by those losses. State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 45 C.F.R. § 155 (2021).
150
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–1; see, e.g., S. 109, Gen. Assemb., 2011–2012 Reg. Sess.
§§ 4402, 4403(7) (Vt. 2011).
151
See, e.g., S.B. 5526, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. § 6(1) (Wash. 2019).
152
See id.
153
See UCCELLO, supra note 109, at 13.
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the Colorado legislature proposed that at least two carriers offer the Colorado Option Plan in the individual market in every county and granted the
Insurance Commissioner the authority to require carriers to offer the Colorado Option Plan in specific counties to fulfill this mandate.154 Geographic
market requirements can help states ensure the availability of individual
market coverage throughout the state.
Beyond the individual market, states can also offer MBPO plans to allow small and large employers to enroll their employees. Expanding MBPOs
to small employers can ease premium volatility and provide a more affordable choice in this typically dysfunctional market.155 Broadening MBPO enrollment to include large groups would significantly expand the risk pool
and increase its purchasing power, while offering employers and employees
an affordable coverage option that reduces administrative burden. As noted
above, offering large group plans on the Marketplace may require the state
to apply for a Section 1332 waiver of the ACA’s employer mandate and
other requirements.156 Over the last decade, Massachusetts proposed a series
of nearly identical bills that would offer a state public option in both small
and large group markets.157 Illinois followed suit in 2013 by offering HB
5733, which largely mirrored the Massachusetts bills.158 These bills proposed
allowing a wide array of associations and entities to offer their employees
and members insurance through the MBPO.159 Section 1332 waivers can enable states to cover a very broad target population through MBPOs and
move toward removing the tether between employment and health
insurance.
In the absence of a Section 1332 waiver, however, the ACA imposes
eligibility restrictions that limit states’ ability to reach some target populations. For instance, states cannot use MBPO plans to offer insurance options
to undocumented immigrants or individuals who have access to employersponsored insurance that qualifies as affordable under the ACA without a
Section 1332 waiver.160 Given these limits and the political uncertainty of
154
See H.B. 20-1349, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 10-16-1205(1) (b) (Colo.
2020); see also S.F. 2302, 91st Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. art. 9 § 15 subd. 1–2 (Minn. 2019).
155
See, e.g., COLO. DIV. OF INS. & DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE POL’Y & FIN., FINAL REPORT
FOR COLORADO’S PUBLIC OPTION 21 (2019) [hereinafter COLORADO REPORT ON THE PUBLIC
OPTION].
156
See supra text accompanying notes 129–30.
157
See H.B. 1228, 187th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011); S.B. 514, 188th Gen. Ct.,
Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013); H.B. 1033, 189th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2015); S.B. 638, 190th
Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017); S.B. 697, 191st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Mass. 2019).
158
See H.B. 5733, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 20 (Ill. 2013).
159
See Mass. S.B. 697 § 3 (including sole proprietors, labor unions, trade associations,
and others).
160
See 42 U.S.C. § 18081(a)(1). In 2016, California applied for a Section 1332 waiver to
permit undocumented individuals to purchase plans on the state-based Marketplace, but withdrew the application when the Trump Administration took office. See Letter from Peter V. Lee,
Exec. Dir., Covered Cal. Bd. of Dirs., to Sylvia Matthews Burwell, Sec. of Health & Hum.
Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. on Covered California 1332 State Innovation
Waiver Application – Resubmission (Dec. 16, 2016) (on file with authors); see also Letter
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obtaining a Section 1332 waiver, state legislatures aiming to cover currently
ineligible populations can provide the implementing agency the flexibility to
offer the public option plan on the Marketplace, off the Marketplace, or
both.161
Defining the target population for an MBPO often determines the scope
of the public option proposal. States should consider whether to specify the
target population in implementing legislation or leave the ultimate decision
up to the administrative agency implementing the MBPO. That decision will
depend on how involved a state wants to be in administering the plan.
D. Administration
One of the most consequential decisions states must make in the development of an MBPO is how involved to be in plan administration. As with
Medicaid buy-ins, the choice between a public-private partnership or a stateadministered MBPO depends on the amount of control and authority the
state wants over the MBPO and the state’s willingness to invest time and
resources to gain that control. The easiest and least resource-intensive path
for states is to contract with commercial carriers to offer the MBPO on the
Marketplace—the approach taken by Washington, Colorado, and Virginia.162
As the least “public” of the models, this public-private model allows the
state to specify certain terms of the MBPO, but places the majority of the
administrative burden and financial risk on commercial carriers. The tradeoff for minimal state burden or investment, however, is that the state cedes
control and financial savings. A more traditionally public state-administered
model, exemplified by Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Illinois, would give
states control over finances and unify administration within one governmentrun entity. The downsides of the state-administered model include greater
financial risk, administrative burden, and resource allocation constraints. As
noted above, states with a state-based Marketplace will have more flexibility

from Peter V. Lee, Exec. Dir., Covered Cal. Bd. of Dirs., to Kevin J. Counihan, Dir. & Marketplace Exec. Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. on Covered California 1332 State
Innovation Waiver Application Withdrawal Request (Jan. 18, 2017) (on file with authors).
161
Compare S.B. 346, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. § 2(a)(1), (3) (Conn. 2020) (leaving
decisions of how to define enrollment eligibility and whether to offer the ConnectHealth plan,
Connecticut’s public option, on the Marketplace to the state Comptroller, the entity assigned to
administer the plan), with H.B. 20-1349, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 10-161205(2)(a)(1) (Colo. 2020) (requiring the Insurance Commissioner to offer the public option
plan to all individuals that purchase health insurance in the individual market in plans offered
both on and off the Marketplace). See also H.B. 21-1232, 73rd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. § 10-16-1304(1) (Colo. 2021) (requiring the Commissioner to establish a standardized
health benefit plan to be offered by carriers in the individual and small group markets both on
and off the Marketplace).
162
See S.B. 5526, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. § 3(1)(c) (Wash. 2019); H.B. 20-1349, 72nd
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 10-16-1205 (Colo. 2020); H.B. 530, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. § 32.1-329.1(B) (Va. 2020).
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to administer their own MBPO than states with federally-run Marketplaces,
due to uniformity requirements on the federal Marketplace.163
1. Public-Private Partnership with Commercial Plans
The simplest way for states to create an MBPO is to contract with commercial insurance carriers to offer plans with state-specified criteria. These
state-specified criteria can range from little more than the ACA requirements
for QHPs and some provider reimbursement restrictions164 to complex benefit design models and cost-saving mechanisms. Two of the three states that
have gone farthest in implementing a public option, Washington and Colorado, took the latter approach, requiring commercial carriers to implement
state-designed plans with a broad range of specifications.165
In 2019, Washington created the nation’s first public health insurance
option, known as CascadeCare.166 Though not publicly administered, Washington called the plan a “public option” because the state imposed “publicsector reimbursement rates on a commercial insurance market.”167 According to Michael Sparer, Washington’s “goal was to derive the benefits of a
public option without the political, organizational, and economic tasks of
creating a new, state-administered insurer.”168
Washington created a public-private hybrid that required the Health
Care Authority, in consultation with the Health Benefit Exchange, to contract with commercial carriers to offer the public option plan on the Marketplace.169 Carriers, however, are not required to participate.170 Instead, the
Health Care Authority must contract with sufficient carriers to offer the public option in every county.171
Washington imposed several conditions on its public option plans.172
Significantly, the law limits provider reimbursement in the aggregate to
160% of Medicare reimbursement rates for the same or similar services.173
Other requirements include rate review and network adequacy, care coordination, value-based purchasing, and generic drug and utilization review re163

See supra discussion accompanying notes 126–27.
See, e.g., H.B. 530, Gen. Assemb., 2020 Reg. Sess. § 32.1-329.1(D) (Va. 2020).
165
See Wash. S.B. 5526; Colo. H.B. 20-1349; Colo. H.B. 21-1232.
166
See Billy Wynne, Public Option 1.0: Washington State Takes an Important Step Forward, HEALTH AFFS.: BLOG (May 1, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20190430.353036/full/ [https://perma.cc/VWC8-T477]; Cascade Care, WASH. STATE
HEALTH CARE AUTH., https://www.hca.wa.gov/about-hca/cascade-care [https://perma.cc/
WYD5-FEVX].
167
Sparer, supra note 38, at 263.
168
Id.
169
2019 Wash. Sess. Laws, enacting Engrossed Substitute S.B. 5526, 66th Leg., 2019
Reg. Sess. § 3(1) (Wash. 2019).
170
See Sparer, supra note 38, at 264.
171
See S.B. 5526, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. § 3(1) (Wash. 2019).
172
See id. § 3(2).
173
See id. § 3(2)(g)(i). For a discussion of Washington’s provider rate limits, see infra
Section II.E.2.
164
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quirements.174 The authority granted to Washington state agencies gives them
significant control over the features and functions of the contracted CascadeCare plans.
Like Washington, Colorado pursued a public-private hybrid that requires commercial insurers to offer a state-regulated “Colorado Option
Plan” on the Marketplace. In 2019, the Colorado legislature directed state
health authorities to develop a proposal to create an “innovative state option
for health insurance coverage.”175 A bill to implement the ensuing plan appeared poised to pass in 2020, but was tabled due to COVID-19.176 The bill,
H.B. 20-1349, would have required all carriers that offer a health plan in the
individual market to also offer the Colorado Option Plan in the same county.
Colorado’s H.B. 20-1349 covered the EHBs; provided at least bronze and
silver levels of coverage; and offered first-dollar, pre-deductible coverage
for certain services, such as primary health care and behavioral health
care.177 Further, the bill granted the Insurance Commissioner the ability to
require carriers to offer public option plans in specific counties.178
Colorado’s 2020 bill was unique because it created a powerful, independent board to oversee public option development.179 The Board would advise
the Commissioner on all aspects of the development, implementation, and
operation of the Colorado Option Plan,180 and has the ability to override any
decision made by the Commissioner concerning the Colorado Option Plan.181
The combination of a state official with significant power over plan design,
private entities to implement it, and an independent advisory and oversight
body with override power would have allowed the state to tailor the public
option plan to its specifications while avoiding many of the challenges of
self-administering the plan and keeping the risk of agency capture in
check.182 With significant concessions to health care providers and private

174
175

See Wash. S.B. 5526 § 3.
H.B. 19-1004, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 25.5-1-129 (1)(a)(VII)(b) (Colo.

2019).
176
See Ryan Osborne, Colorado Public Health Insurance Option Put on Hold Due to
Covid-19, DENV. CHANNEL (May 4, 2020), https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/localnews/colorado-public-health-insurance-option-bill-put-on-hold-due-to-covid-19 [https://
perma.cc/E2YA-Z7D4]. The state will likely reintroduce the bill in 2021.
177
See H.B. 20-1349, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 10-16-1205 (2)(a) (Colo.
2020).
178
See id. § 10-16-1205(1)(b).
179
See id. New Jersey also proposed the creation of the New Jersey Public Option Health
Care Board within the Department of Health, but it has less authority, as its power to establish
and amend regulations are subject to approval by the Commissioner of Health. See S. 1947,
219th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5.a. (N.J. 2020).
180
This includes plan standardization, allocation of federal pass-through funds, the federal
waiver application process, value-based payment models, the possibility of offering the Colorado Option Plan in the small group market, and ways to improve quality, access, and affordability of health care. See Colo. H.B. 20-1349 § 10-16-1204(5)(a)–(g).
181
See id. § 10-16-1204(6) (allowing override by a vote of seven of nine Board members).
182
For a detailed description of the membership requirements, appointment proceedings,
and powers of the Colorado Option Advisory Board, see id. § 10-16-1204.
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health carriers, the Colorado legislature passed a scaled-back version of its
public option in 2021, described in Part IV below.
By partnering with private commercial carriers to administer and provide MBPO plans, states can dictate certain aspects of the public option,
such as provider reimbursement caps and benefit design features, without
taking administrative and financial responsibility for the plans themselves.
However, this public-private model risks sacrificing much of the potential
savings and premium reductions available through a more traditionally public MBPO model.
2. State-Administered MBPOs
Instead of partnering with commercial carriers, several states have proposed a state-administered MBPO.183 State-administered MBPOs provide
greater control over all aspects of the public option without the constraints of
working with commercial carriers, their profit demands, or the concern that
carriers may intentionally compromise the public option.
States may authorize the state official in charge of administering the
MBPO to contract with third party administrators (“TPAs”), insurance companies that agree to handle only the administrative functions of a plan, to
carry-out various tasks including receipt of individual premiums and
PTCs.184 The main difference between this and the hybrid approach taken in
Washington is that the state retains the insurance risk, essentially operating
like a self-funded plan sponsor with a commercial TPA to administer some
portion or all of the plan.185
While state-administered MBPOs offer states greater autonomy and
flexibility to design their public option plan, state administration also creates
some challenges. One of the largest challenges is that the ACA requires a
state-licensed issuer of insurance to offer QHPs,186 and PTCs may only be
paid to an issuer of a QHP.187 Without state legislative action, state entities
are not generally considered issuers of insurance. Furthermore, the ACA’s
risk adjustment program, which stabilizes the individual market by transferring funds from health insurance issuers with lower-risk enrollees to issuers
with higher-risk enrollees, is only available to health insurance issuers, so

183
See H. 88, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2015); H.B. 5733, 98th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013); S.B. 697, 191st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019); S.B. 346, 2020 Gen.
Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2020); S.F. 2302, 91st Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2019).
184
See, e.g., Conn. S.B. 346 § 2(a)(6); Mass. S.B. 697 § 1 (amending Chapter 176 by
adding Chapter 176S which includes Sec. 4 discussing the use of TPAs).
185
The decision of whether the state retains insurance risk is discussed infra Section II.E.
1.
186
See 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1).
187
See id. § 18082(c)(2)(A) (“The Secretary of the Treasury shall make the advance payment under this section of any premium tax credit allowed under section 36B of [the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986] to the issuer of a qualified health plan on a monthly basis . . . .”); see
also BOOZANG ET AL., supra note 38, at 4.
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the state would need to qualify as an insurance issuer to participate.188 The
state could have more flexibility to extend risk adjustment to the state-offered MBPO if it runs its own risk adjustment program, but this large undertaking may require the state to operate its own Marketplace.189
States proposing to administer their MBPOs have tried several approaches. First, Connecticut authorized a state official to contract directly
with a TPA to administer the MBPO and receive premiums and premium tax
credits.190 Second, Minnesota passed legislation designating a state entity as
an issuer of insurance or a managed care organization capable of offering a
QHP and receiving federal PTCs and pass-through funds.191 Third, Massachusetts passed legislation allowing the MBPO to be offered on the Marketplace.192 Finally, Illinois proposed creating a new state entity authorized by
the legislature to stand in the shoes of a carrier for the purposes of administering and funding a QHP offered on the Marketplace.193 Each of these options represents a state’s attempt to satisfy the ACA’s requirement that a QHP
be offered by a state-licensed insurance issuer. While none have been implemented or tested, Minnesota’s approach appears to the most robust in terms
of satisfying the ACA requirements.
In sum, the choice about who administers the public option depends on
state agency capacity and political will—the more a state has of both, the
more likely it can shoulder MBPO administration. Options that designate a
state entity to certify the MBPO for Marketplace eligibility or contract with
a TPA to offer the plans on the Marketplace are unlikely to require a Section
1332 waiver because they do not interfere with any of the ACA’s specific
requirements. However, the creation of an entirely new state entity to design
and manage an MBPO on the Marketplace may require a Section 1332
waiver because it would modify the requirements for QHP certification.
Whether it does will also depend on the financing features of the new plan.
E. Financial Considerations
Financing for a public option can come from three sources: (1) premiums and cost-sharing; (2) federal funds; and (3) state tax revenues. A public
188

See 42 U.S.C. § 18063.
See BOOZANG ET AL., supra note 38, at 5.
190
See S.B. 346, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. § 2(a)(6) (Conn. 2020).
191
See S.F. 2302, 91st Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. art. 9 § 14 subd. 1(d) (Minn. 2019) (stating
that the Dep’t of Human Services is deemed to meet and receive certification and authority
under Section 62D.03).
192
See S.B. 697, 191st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. § 4 (Mass. 2019) (modifying Chapter 176Q
§ 5(a) to read: “Only health insurance plans and stand-alone vision or stand-alone dental plans
that have been approved by the commissioner and underwritten by a carrier, as well as the
public health insurance option, may be offered through the connector.”).
193
See H.B. 5733, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 15 (Ill. 2013) (creating Health Insurance Connector Authority that would operate as independent public entity to develop and administer Illinois public option plan, which must be offered exclusively on Illinois’s
Marketplace and meet all Marketplace plan requirements).
189
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option that relies only on funding from enrollees may not be affordable,
particularly to the remaining uninsured population. Accordingly, many models seek federal funds to offer subsidies to low-income residents, and federal
funds from ACA subsidies and pass-through funds for plans sold on the
Marketplaces serve as a large well of funding.194 The ACA provides strong
financial incentives for states to offer their public option plans on the Marketplace.195 At a baseline level, MBPO enrollees are eligible for the federally
funded PTCs and CSRs offered through the ACA. Furthermore, if states can
qualify for a Section 1332 waiver, the state can also receive pass-through
savings from the federal government to help fund the plan.196 These Marketplace-based financial supports can help bolster states’ ability to offer public
option plans and drive the decision to offer them on the Marketplace.
All state models we reviewed would finance MBPOs in large part
through premiums paid by enrollees. Where states differ is whether the state
or commercial carriers bear the financial risk of offering the MBPO plans. A
second financial consideration is what cost control mechanisms to implement. There is a relationship between the two—the more financial risk and
administrative burden a state can shoulder, the greater the potential savings
it can generate.
1. Financial Risk-Bearing
As with administration, a state can shift financial risk and the attendant
resources to manage the risk (such as maintaining adequate financial
reserves) to commercial carriers offering MBPO plans. In this public-private
model, commercial carriers bear the insurance risk in exchange for the ability to earn a profit from the public option. Colorado noted the value of this
type of model in its Final Report, stating “[t]he public option will not put
the State budget at risk. Insurance companies—not the State—will bear the
risk for the payment of health claims, as they currently do in the Individual
market.”197 Yet, the reduction in risk comes at the expense of working
through profit-driven commercial insurers, which may compromise cost-savings overall.
States choosing the public-private model have taken varied roles in setting premiums to control costs. These models include: (1) allowing commercial carriers to set rates;198 (2) requiring the insurance commissioner to

194
See 26 U.S.C. § 36B (providing PTCs on Marketplace); 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (providing
CSRs); see generally Matthew B. Lawrence, Fiscal Waivers and State “Innovation” in Health
Care, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1477, 1487–92 (2021) (noting that these funds are “big
money”).
195
See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text.
196
See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text.
197
COLO. REP. ON THE PUB. OPTION, supra note 155, at 17.
198
For example, Virginia’s H.B. 530 would require commercial carriers to design MBPO
plans to limit increases in premium rates, while the state does not take an active role in setting

R
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regulate how commercial carriers set premiums;199 (3) requiring the insurance commissioner to review and approve proposed rates; and (4) designating a state agency to establish premiums for the MBPO. States may also
combine approaches. Washington requires carriers offering the public option
plan to have their rates reviewed and approved by the Insurance Commissioner.200 Granting the Insurance Commissioner the authority to deny premium rates and even provider rate increases, as Rhode Island has done, can
restrain premium growth and provide an additional lever to control provider
reimbursement rates.201 Public-private partnership models shift the state’s financial risk to insurers, while allowing the state to retain some oversight
over MBPO premiums, particularly if the state grants the Insurance Commissioner prior approval authority.
Other states would retain financial risk and administer the financial aspects of the MBPO, including setting premiums and cost sharing, to control
costs.202 By retaining financial risk, the state can keep the MBPO revenues
rather than having them go to insurance carrier profits. States typically propose implementing this model by assigning financial responsibility to existing state agencies.203 For instance, Minnesota’s S.F. 2302 would make the
Commissioner of Human Services responsible for ensuring the financial sustainability of the MBPO, establishing premiums and provider payment rates,
accounting for administrative costs, and creating a reserve account within
the state treasury to collect enrollee premiums and pay claims.204 The Commissioner would be able to accept and expend all federal funds available to
the state through the MBPO.205 Similarly, Massachusetts’ 2019 MBPO proposal would grant the Commonwealth Connector, the state Marketplace, the
authority to set premiums for the public health insurance option and estab-

or approving premium rates for the MBPO. See H.B. 530, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
§ 32.1-329.1(D) (Va. 2020).
199
See, e.g., H.B. 20-1349, 72d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 10-16-1205 (3)(b) (Colo.
2020) (allowing carriers to establish premium rates for the Colorado Option plan, but requiring
the Insurance Commissioner to adopt rules “concerning the premium amounts for silver
plans” based on their actuarial value).
200
See S.B. 5526, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. § 3(1) (Wash. 2019).
201
Although none of the state MBPO proposals we reviewed included this authority,
Rhode Island has given its Insurance Commissioner broad authority to disapprove of insurance
premiums or contracts if they exceed caps on provider reimbursement increases. This authority
could be added to premium oversight in an MBPO to enforce provider reimbursement limits in
the MBPO plan. See Aaron Baum, Zirui Song, Bruce E. Landon, Russell S. Phillips, Asaf
Bitton & Sanjay Basu, Health Care Spending Slowed After Rhode Island Applied Affordability
Standards to Commercial Insurers, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 237, 242–43 (2019).
202
See S.B. 346, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. 2020 §§ 2, 4 (Conn. 2020); S.F. 2302,
91st Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. art. 9 § 14 subd. 1 (Minn. 2019); S.B. 697, 191st Gen. Ct., Reg.
Sess. § 6 (Mass. 2019); H.B. 5733, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 35 (Ill. 2013).
203
But see Ill. H.B. 5733 § 35 (creating a new public entity, the Health Insurance Connector Authority, to administer the public health option).
204
See Minn. S.F. 2302 art. 9 § 14 subdiv. 1(b), 1(e), 3–4.
205
See id. art. 9 §§ 14 subdiv. 1(b)(2), 15 subdiv. 3 (specifically noting that the Department of Human Services is not an insurance company).
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lish the Public Health Insurance Option Fund to hold funds designated for
public option plans.206
In sum, states must determine how much to invest in MBPO plan financing based on their policy goals. Avoiding reliance on commercial carriers will improve affordability and expand coverage, but will also place the
state at greater financial risk.
2. Cost Control
Regardless of a state’s financing strategy, all states considering a public
option plan seek to reduce the cost of health care. While MBPO plans employ a range of cost control mechanisms,207 provider payment caps hold the
most promise for reducing costs throughout the Marketplace.
Nearly all MBPO bills would limit provider payments to a percentage
of Medicare rates or other established payment schedule.208 Medicare-based
caps on provider rates ranged from 100% of Medicare rates in Virginia to
160% of Medicare in Washington.209 Establishing provider payment rates is
often the most politically contentious aspect of an MBPO. As a result, some
state legislatures proposed delegating decisions regarding provider payments
and participation to the state agency leading implementation.210
In terms of controlling provider rates, the Colorado legislature went
through several iterations. Initially, the legislature proposed setting the
benchmark for provider payments between 175% and 225% of Medicare
rates, but instead its 2020 bill charged the Commissioner of Insurance with
establishing “a clear, public, and transparent formula, which may very well
fall in that range, but importantly, will be applied on a hospital-by-hospital

206

See Mass. S.B. 697 §§ 1, 3.
Aside from provider payment caps, states have increased medical loss ratios and implemented pharmaceutical cost controls. See, e.g., H.B. 20-1349, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg.
Sess. § 10-16-1205(2)(a)(VI)–(VII) (Colo. 2020) (raising the medical loss ratio to eighty-five
percent and requiring all carriers to pass-through pharmaceutical rebates); Conn. S.B. 346
§ 2(a)(2)(F) (raising the medical loss ratio to ninety percent); S.B. 5526, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg.
Sess. § 3(2)(j) (Wash. 2019) (promoting generic substitution and evidence-based formularies).
208
See Minn. S.F. 2302 art. 9 § 14 subd. 3 (basing provider payments rates for the state’s
Basic Health Plan); Mass. S.B. 697 § 1 (basing payment rates on Medicare Parts A and B with
adjustments); H.B. 5733, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 40 (Ill. 2013) (mirroring Massachusetts); Colo. H.B. 20-1349 § 10-16-1206(1)(c) (establishing a base rate of 155% of Medicare rates with adjustments); Wash. S.B. 5526 § 3(2)(g)(i) (stating that total qualified health
plan reimbursement cannot exceed 160 % of Medicare rates); H.B. 530, 2020 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. § 32.1-329.1(D) (Va. 2020) (stating rates shall not exceed Medicare rates).
209
See, e.g., Va. H.B. 530 § 32.1-329.1(D); Wash. S.B. 5526 § 3(2)(g)(i).
210
See, e.g., Conn. R.B. 346 § 2(c)(1)(B), (D) (Conn. 2020) (charging the Comptroller
with developing both “strategies to ensure that health care providers and health care facilities
in this state participate in the ConnectHealth Plan;” and “a proposed schedule of the initial
payments and reimbursement rates for the ConnectHealth Plan.”); Colo. H.B. 20-1349 § 1016-1206(1)(a) (requiring the Commissioner to implement a formula that “sets reasonable carrier reimbursement rates” and helps “lower premiums and out-of-pocket costs for consumers
and to increase access to health care in rural areas.”).
207
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basis to incentivize efficiency and results.”211 Colorado recognized not all
hospitals were equally able to reduce rates without compromising patient
care and access, particularly critical access hospitals and smaller, independent hospitals.212 To address this variability, the 2020 bill proposed a reimbursement formula considering a range of factors, including: (1) a hospital’s
payer mix; (2) whether the hospital is critical access, rural, urban, independent, or part of a larger system; (3) patient margins, total margins, and accumulated earnings over time; and (4) administrative expenses compared to
national norms.213 Under this formula, the base hospital payment rate would
be 155% of Medicare rates, with increases for specified providers.214 Designed to rein in costs over time, the formula would have evolved in response to analysis of its impact on critical access, rural, and other vulnerable
hospitals.215 As Washington did initially but later repealed,216 Colorado’s
2020 bill would have granted the Commissioner the discretion to exempt
hospitals that demonstrated that the prescribed reimbursement rate would
have “a significant adverse effect on its financial sustainability.”217 Interestingly, Colorado’s 2021 legislation shifted tactics away from provider rate
controls to focus on achieving a fifteen percent premium reduction over
three years.218 The Commissioner can only set rates, for which the hospital
base rate remains 155%, if the carriers cannot achieve the required premium
reductions.219 Furthermore, the Commissioner cannot set the final hospital
reimbursement rate less than 165% of Medicare rates.220
Overall, regulating provider payment rates for MBPOs will be one of
the most politically challenging and practically difficult implementation
tasks, but it is also one of the most important for controlling costs.
F. Market Effects
In addition to controlling costs, states must account for the effect of
MBPOs on Marketplace dynamics. Several state bills require those implementing an MBPO to submit reports to the legislature regarding the impact
211
Id. Colo. H.B. 20-1349 § 10-16-1206(1); COLO. REP. ON THE PUB. OPTION, supra note
156, at 13.
212
See COLO. REP. ON THE PUB. OPTION, supra note 156, at 13.
213
Id.
214
See Colo. H.B. 20-1349 § 10-16-1206(1)(c) (adding twenty percentage points to rates
for either critical access or independent hospitals among others).
215
See COLO. REP. ON THE PUB. OPTION, supra note 156, at 13–14; Colo. H.B. 20-1349
§ 10-16-1206(2) (requiring the Colorado Public Option Board to advise the Commissioner on
modifications to the reimbursement formula and the percentage point adjustments after the
first two years of the program).
216
See supra Introduction.
217
Colo. H.B. 20-1349 § 10-16-1206(2)(5)(a) (requiring the Commissioner to make this
decision in consultation with the Department of Health Care Policy and Financing and the
Board).
218
See Colo. H.B. 21-1232 § 10-16-1304(1); infra Part IV.
219
See Colo. H.B. 21-1232 § 10-16-1306(4)(a)(II).
220
See Colo. H.B. 21-1232 § 10-16-1306(5)(a).
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or potential impact of the MBPO on the health care market, including provider and plan participation, federal funding, cost-shifting, and risk
adjustment.221
1. The Potential for the MBPO to Reduce Provider and Plan
Participation
The introduction of an MBPO can disrupt both provider and plan participation in certain markets, especially if the provider rate or premium controls are significant. States designing MBPOs have implemented a range of
provisions that either incentivize or require provider and plan participation.
The largest potential market effect from an MBPO is the reduction in
provider participation resulting from price controls, which can, in turn, compromise plan participation. In setting provider payment rates, state policymakers must balance the desire for cost savings against the need to retain
sufficient provider participation to satisfy network adequacy requirements.222
If provider payment rates sink too low, providers will not participate in
MBPO plans, threatening their viability. While states have exercised some
leverage to require commercial carriers that offer plans on the Exchange to
also offer MBPO plans, most MBPO bills do not require provider participation. Instead, to encourage provider participation, state MBPO proposals rely
on: (1) commercial carriers;223 (2) automatic enrollment of Medicare providers with an opt-out;224 and (3) payment rates.225
Washington’s experience highlights the difficult balancing act of setting
provider rates and ensuring provider participation. State representative Eileen Cody, the architect of S.B. 5526, originally sought a reimbursement cap
at 100% of Medicare rates, but the final legislation increased the rate cap to
160% of Medicare, calculated in aggregate. At this level, actuaries estimated
that carriers could offer public option premiums five to ten percent cheaper
than current Marketplace premiums without destabilizing the insurance markets and alienating providers.226 However, the 160% of Medicare rate cap
may have been too low to attract providers and too high to reduce premi-

221
See S.B. 5526, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. § 5 (Wash. 2019); Colo. H.B. 20-1349 § 1016-1207; R.B. 346, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. § 2(a)(5)(Conn. 2020); S.F. 2302, 91st
Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. §§ 14 subd. 1(b)(2), 15 subd. 2 (Minn. 2019); S.B. 697, 191st Gen. Ct.,
2019–2020 Sess. § 5 (Mass. 2019); H.B. 5733, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 30 (Ill. 2013).
222
See Chapin White, Christine Eibner, Jodi L. Liu, Carter C. Price, Nora Leibowitz,
Gretchen Morley, Jeanene Smith, Tina Edlund & Jack Meyer, A Comprehensive Assessment of
Four Options for Financing Health Care Delivery in Oregon, RAND HEALTH Q., 2017, at 1, 4.
Network adequacy laws require health plans to include sufficient numbers of providers within
a certain geographic area in their networks to provide care to the patient population.
223
See Va. H.B. 530 § 32.1-329.1(A).
224
See, e.g., Ill. H.B. 5733 § 45; Mass. S.B. 697 § 8.
225
See Wash. S.B. 5526 § 2(g)–(i) (establishing a payment floor for primary care providers at 135%).
226
Sparer, supra note 38, at 265 (noting that the aggregate cap allows plans to pay some
providers more than 160% of Medicare and others less).
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ums.227 At least one carrier found providers, especially hospitals, reluctant to
contract even at 160% of Medicare rates.228 In its first year, 2021, insurers
offered public option plans in only twenty of the state’s thirty-nine counties.229 Washington responded by passing S.B. 5377 in 2021, which provides
that if a public option plan is not offered in every county, any hospital licensed in the state that provides services to enrollees in the public or school
employee benefit programs or Medicaid must contract with at least one public option plan.230 In addition, the average proposed 2021 premium for plans
offered via the CascadeCare public exchange was five percent higher than
the 2020 average Marketplace premium and varied among carriers and geographic areas.231 These proposed CascadeCare premiums represent some carriers’ first attempt to rate the Washington public option population, and they
may stabilize with experience. If not, states may need to incorporate additional tools to improve MBPO affordability.
To address the hydraulic relationship of provider rates and network participation, MBPO legislation often includes exceptions to ensure sufficient
provider participation. For instance, Washington’s MBPO law initially allowed the Director of the Health Care Authority, in his or her sole discretion,
to waive the provider payment cap of 160% of Medicare rates for any carrier
that is “unable to form a provider network that meets the network access
standards adopted by the insurance commissioner” but remains able “to
achieve actuarially sound premiums that are ten percent lower than the previous plan year through other means.”232 In its effort to strengthen the public
option in 2021, Washington eliminated this waiver authority with the passage of S.B. 5377, which also requires hospital participation if all counties
were not covered by a public option plan by 2022.233 To encourage participation, Washington also included a minimum payment threshold of 101% of
Medicare rates for rural critical access hospitals and sole community hospitals, as well as 135% of Medicare rates for primary care providers.234
Policymakers designing Colorado’s 2020 public option proposal also
stressed the importance of ensuring provider participation for public option
viability, noting that “if there are areas where networks are not adequate, the
State could implement measures to ensure that health systems participate
227

See Hansard, supra note 20.
See id.
229
See Louise Norris, Washington’s Health Insurance Marketplace: History and News of
the State’s Exchange, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.healthinsurance.
org/health-insurance-marketplaces/washington/ [https://perma.cc/YU4A-6J3M].
230
See S. 5377, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021).
231
See id.; Norris, supra note 229. For instance, Community Health Network of Washington, a non-profit carrier that offers Medicaid managed care plans, proposed lower CascadeCare
premiums than the benchmark silver plan in certain areas, while United Healthcare of Washington proposed monthly premiums for the CascadeCare plan for a forty-year-old non-smoker
that were fifty dollars higher than premiums for a comparable silver tier non-standardized plan.
232
See S. 5526, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019).
233
See Wash. S. 5377.
234
See id.
228
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and provide cost effective, quality care to covered individuals.”235 Colorado’s 2020 bill took a stronger position than Washington did initially, requiring hospitals licensed by the Department of Health Care Policy and
Financing, with some exceptions, to participate in the Colorado Option plan
and accept its reimbursement rates.236 The Department could fine hospitals
that refuse to participate up to $10,000 for the first thirty days and up to
$40,000 a day thereafter, and could suspend, revoke, or impose conditions
on the hospital’s license.237 Yet, the two states ended up switching places—
with Washington adding a requirement in 2021 for hospitals to participate in
the public option and Colorado limiting its hospital participation and ratesetting requirements to instances where it is established in a series of hearings that a carrier is unable to meet the required premium reductions or network adequacy requirements due to hospital recalcitrance.238
Unlike Washington, Colorado has consistently required plan participation. The 2020 bill would have required all carriers that offer a health plan in
the individual markets to also offer the Colorado Option Plan in the same
county.239 The 2021 legislation maintained this requirement for standardized
plans in the individual and small group markets.240 Furthermore, the Commissioner, subject to certain considerations, can compel a carrier to offer the
standardized plan in specific counties where no carrier is offering the standardized plan.241 By requiring plan participation and minimum premium reductions, the Colorado legislation bolsters insurance companies’ abilities and
incentives to wrest price reductions from providers.
Whether through mandated participation or participation requirements
only if certain premium and coverage goals are not met, states implementing
a public option need a mechanism to monitor and, if needed, require provider and plan participation in the public option.
2. The Impact of MBPO on Federal Funding
Introducing an MBPO plan into the Marketplace could also inadvertently increase consumers’ premium costs for commercial Marketplace plans
by reducing the amount of premium tax credits, which are calculated based
on the second-cheapest silver plan on the Marketplace.242 If the MBPO

235

COLORADO REPORT ON THE PUBLIC OPTION, supra note 155, at 20.
See H.R. 20-1349, 72d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2020).
See id.
238
See S. 5377, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021); H.R. 21-1232, 73d Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021).
239
See Colo. H.R. 20-1349 .
240
See Colo. H.R. 21-1232.
241
See id.
242
See Key Facts: Premium Tax Credit, HEALTH REFORM: BEYOND THE BASICS, (Aug.
2020), https://www.healthreformbeyondthebasics.org/premium-tax-credits-answers-to-fre
quently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/E6W3-7K4B] (explaining how the benchmark plan
premium interacts with the premium tax credit and other plans on the market).
236
237
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reduces premiums for the second-lowest silver plan, then, absent a Section
1332 waiver, all the premium tax credits would also decline.243
The Final Report for Colorado’s Public Option recommends the state
apply for a Section 1332 waiver to enable the state to “draw down federal
savings that would otherwise be spent on tax credits for higher-premium
QHPs absent the lower-cost public option.”244 The state could then use these
pass-through funds to provide additional subsidies to improve affordability
on the Marketplace, including extending CSRs to individuals earning up to
400% of FPL, funding additional high-value benefits, such as dental care, or
increasing premium subsidies available to enrollees.245 Without a Section
1332 waiver, the state would lose access to any federal savings that resulted
from its public option plans, and effectively increase the unsubsidized premium costs of non-MBPO plans on the Marketplace.
3. Cost Shifting
All states seek to use the MBPO to control health care costs, both directly through caps on provider payments and indirectly through competition. Yet some fear that MBPOs’ rate limits may cause providers and insurers
to increase their rates and premiums, respectively, in other markets.246 While
the empirical literature casts doubt on the extent of cost shifting between
public and private payers,247 state public option proposals include mechanisms to monitor for this potential effect. As noted in the Final Report for
Colorado’s Public Option, “cost shifting only happens if we let it.”248 The
Final Report also identified several policy tools to prevent the threat of cost
shifting, including expanding the public option to the small group market,
transitioning provider payment rates gradually, and publishing the public option rates for use in private payers’ negotiations with providers.249 Colorado
authorized the Commissioner to monitor commercial health insurers for
cost-shifting attempts and disapprove the requested rate increase if “the rate
filing reflects a cost shift between the standardized plan . . . and the health
243

See UCCELLO, supra note 109, at 14.
COLORADO REPORT ON THE PUBLIC OPTION, supra note 155, at 23–24 (estimating that
Colorado would receive approximately $89 million per year in federal pass-through savings);
see also Colo. H.B. 21-1232 § 10-16-1308(1) (granting the Commissioner the authority to
apply for a Section 1332 waiver to capture all applicable savings to the federal government).
245
See COLORADO REPORT ON THE PUBLIC OPTION, supra note 155, at 23.
246
See id. at 16.
247
See, e.g., Austin B. Frakt, How Much Do Hospitals Cost Shift? A Review of the Evidence, 89 MILBANK Q. 90, 123 (2011); Chapin White, Contrary to Cost-Shift Theory, Lower
Medicare Hospital Payment Rates for Inpatient Care Lead to Lower Private Payment Rates,
32 HEALTH AFFS. 935, 941 (2013); David Dranove, Craig Garthwaite & Christopher Ody,
How Do Hospitals Respond to Negative Financial Shocks? The Impact of the 2008 Stock Market Crash 29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 18853, 2013); Chapin White &
Tracy Yee, When Medicare Cuts Hospital Prices, Seniors Use Less Inpatient Care, 32 HEALTH
AFFS. 1789, 1794 (2013).
248
COLORADO REPORT ON THE PUBLIC OPTION, supra note 155, at 17.
249
See id.
244
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benefit plan” requesting the rate increase.250 The combination of a transparent formula for calculating public option rates and an Insurance Commissioner with the power to review and approve both commercial carrier rates
and the negotiated provider rates helps safeguard against any potential cost
shifting.
4. Adverse Selection and Risk Adjustment
States might also be wary that the MBPO could attract higher-risk, unhealthier enrollees, which could drive up the cost of the MBPO and threaten
its financial viability. States can implement safeguards to minimize these
risks, such as risk adjustment or reinsurance, but they may need the additional regulatory flexibility that comes with a state-run Marketplace and a
Section 1332 waiver to do so. Offering a public option plan both on and off
the Exchange or altering the MBPO’s benefit design or benefits can shift
enrollment patterns in ways that affect premiums and challenge risk adjustment methods.251 To address this risk, states introducing an MBPO into the
individual and small group markets can alleviate fear that the public option
plan will destabilize the market by including the MBPO in state risk adjustment programs.252
Of all MBPO bills, Colorado’s 2020 bill proposed the most extensive
market oversight framework. It would have required an annual evaluation
and report to the legislature of the public option’s effect on the individual
market, cost shifting between markets, the premium tax credits and cost
sharing reductions received by individuals, and the adequacy of provider
networks.253 In addition, the bill would require an evaluation of “the impact
of the Colorado Option Plan on hospital sustainability, the health care
workforce, and health care wages” be reported to the legislature.254
Regardless of policy goals, all states should monitor the MBPO’s impact on the healthcare markets to ensure the plan is having the desired effect
and not causing unintended harm. To do so, states need access to data that
shows both price and utilization for both providers and insurers, whether
from a state’s all-payer claims database (“APCD”) or direct reporting from
the Marketplace.255
Overall, MBPOs offer states significant flexibility in achieving their
policy goals, access to federal funding, and coverage untethered to employment. States can design MBPOs to accommodate various levels of adminis250

Colo. H.B. 21-1232 § 2 (amending Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-16-107).
See UCCELLO, supra note 109, at 14.
252
See, e.g., S.B. 697, 191st Gen. Ct., 2019–2020 Sess. §§ 2, 8K(a) (Mass. 2019); H.B.
5733, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 155.44 (Ill. 2013).
253
See Colo. H.B. 20-1349 § 10-16-1207(1).
254
Id. at § 10-16-1207(2).
255
See, e.g., Conn. R.B. 346 § 2(a)(5); Minn. S.F. 2302 § 15 subd. 2 (permitting the Commissioner to use APCD data to evaluate the impact of OneCare on the individual market, and
to require submission of additional information to the state APCD).
251
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trative burden and financial risk by allowing state entities to contract with
commercial insurers or administer the MBPO itself. Yet, decisions regarding
state administration and financing face tradeoffs between cost control and
commitment of state resources. In addition, certain plan designs may require
the additional burden of obtaining a Section 1332 waiver.
III. COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC OPTIONS
Comprehensive public option plans are the broadest category of statesponsored plans. They are “comprehensive” in terms of whom they target
(e.g., any resident), their benefits and provider network, and their anticipated
disruption in the health insurance market. The most ambitious Comprehensive public option plans are closest to state single-payer plans, despite their
acknowledgement that a multi-payer system will persist. In Comprehensive
public option plans, the state is assertively entering the market—either as an
insurer itself or through broad regulation of a commercially administered
plan—to offer a public source of coverage to all residents. We found fifteen
bills proposing Comprehensive public option plans in five states: Massachuestts, Michigan, New Jersey, Vermont, and Washington.256 Some of
these models straddle both categories for Marketplace-based plans and Comprehensive plans.
A. Policy Goals
The policy goals of the Comprehensive public option include achieving
universal coverage untethered from employment, applying the state’s rate
setting-authority to the commercial insurance market to control health care
costs, simplifying administrative burdens, reducing fragmentation, and at its
most ambitious, providing a glide-path to a state single-payer system.257
These policy goals are more ambitious than those of the Medicaid buy-in or
MBPO plans that target a narrower, dysfunctional segment of the individual
market or cover the remaining uninsured. Comprehensive plans also try to
reduce fragmentation to pursue administrative simplification and unify the
risk pools of large, small, and individual markets into one state-sponsored
plan.258 The potential cost-savings for Comprehensive public option plans
are greater than their narrower counterparts because the rate-controls and
reduced administrative costs are implemented across a broader swath of the
market, including the large-group market.259
256

See Appendix A.
See, e.g., H.B. 1104, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Wash. 2019) (declaring the people’s intentions in the preamble).
258
See, e.g., H. 28, Gen. Assemb., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. § 1852(a)(4) (Vt. 2017) (providing that “[a]ll participants in the Vermont Public Option shall be maintained in a single risk
pool”).
259
See, e.g., Wash. H.B. 1104 § 1.
257
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B. Target Population
Comprehensive public option plans are state-sponsored plans available
to anyone in the state—a broad combination of different health insurance
market segments, including large groups (both public and private employers), small groups, individuals, and possibly those with Medicaid coverage.
In some proposals, the Comprehensive public option plan would be
available to any resident of the state.260 For example, New Jersey’s S. 1947
provides that “Every resident of the State shall be eligible and entitled to
enroll as a member under the program.”261 Other Comprehensive plans have
broad eligibility, but apply different rules or defaults to the different segments of the market. For example, a 2015 Vermont bill proposed a public
option plan that would cover all public employees automatically and be offered to all other residents, except those eligible for Medicare or Medicaid.262
Finally, Massachusetts proposed a public option plan that straddles the categories for Marketplace-based and Comprehensive plans. These plans would
be offered exclusively on the Marketplace, which traditionally only serves
the individual and small group markets, and would be available to large
groups in the future.263
C. Legal Issues for Comprehensive Public Option Plans
The distinguishing feature of Comprehensive plans is that they explicitly include the large group markets—those with employer-based coverage.
Reaching those with employer-based coverage means that, in addition to the
legal requirements for Marketplace or Medicaid-based plans, Comprehensive plans also must contend with ERISA—the federal law that governs employer-based health benefits—and federal tax laws that subsidize employer
spending on health benefits and limit the tax deductibility of state taxes,
which may be needed to finance the plan. Because they would also target the
individual market and Medicaid, the legal framework for Comprehensive
public option plans rests upon the same legal requirements for Medicaid
plans and Marketplace-based plans, described above.
Due to the resemblance between Comprehensive public option plans
and state single-payer plans, the legal issues of public option plans are comparable to those of single-payer plans.

260
See, e.g., H.B. 6285, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 202 (Mich. 2018); S.B. 5222, 66th Leg.,
2019 Reg. Sess. § 101 (Wash. 2019); Wash. H.B. 1104.
261
S. 1947, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6 (N.J. 2020).
262
See H. 88, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1853 (Vt. 2015).
263
See S.B. 697, 191st Gen. Ct., 2019–2020 Sess. § 1 (Mass. 2019). Lawmakers in Massachusetts have introduced substantially similar public option bills in every legislative session
in our search period. See supra note 147.
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1. ERISA Preemption
One of the biggest legal hurdles states face in comprehensive health
reform is ERISA, which generally hampers states’ abilities to regulate employer-based health benefits and places self-funded employer plans beyond
the reach of state laws. ERISA’s preemption provision expressly preempts
“any and all” state laws that “relate to” employee benefit plans.264 As comprehensively described elsewhere in the literature on public benefits law, the
scope of “relates to” is so indeterminate that it has spawned a convoluted
and voluminous jurisprudence struggling to define the bounds of ERISA’s
sweeping preemption.265
The rule articulated by the courts is that a state law is preempted if it
bears an “impermissible connection with” an ERISA plan.266 This occurs
when a state law requires sponsors “to structure their plans in particular
ways, such as requiring payment of specific benefits,” or if it directly or
indirectly produces “acute . . . economic effects” which would “force an
ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively
restrict its choice of insurers.”267 In other words, state laws that mandate
employers adopt, alter, or administer their employee benefit plans in compliance with state law are preempted because they bear an “impermissible connection with” and thus “relate to” an ERISA plan.268 However, courts have
recognized a limit on what it means to “relate to” an ERISA plan. To the
extent that the presence of a public option may “merely increase costs or
alter incentives for ERISA plans,” state laws with such economic effects are
not preempted by ERISA.269
The legal question is whether ERISA would preempt a Comprehensive
state public option plan offered to employers. ERISA would preempt states
from mandating that employers participate in the state plan,270 but state public option proposals that merely nudge, rather than require, employer participation would find surer footing. The ERISA analysis turns on whether the
plan’s funding mechanisms, such as payroll taxes, cross the line into a “Hob264

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (included as Section 514 in the ERISA).
See, e.g., Erin C. Fuse Brown & Elizabeth McCuskey, Federalism, ERISA, and State
Single-Payer Health Care, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 389, 392–93 (2020); Peter D. Jacobson, The
Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and Limits, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 89–90 (2009).
266
See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016). A state law may also
be preempted if it makes “reference to” an ERISA plan, but that test is not applicable here.
See Rutledge v. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n, 141 S. Ct. 474, 478 (2020).
267
Rutledge, 141 S. Ct. at 480; Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943; N.Y. State Conf. of B.C.B.S.
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995); see Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (collecting cases); see also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 146–47 (2001); Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97–100 (1983) (finding that laws effectively requiring employers to “pay employees specific benefits” are preempted).
268
This includes data reporting requirements by self-funded employer plans. See Gobeille,
136 S. Ct. at 943.
269
Rutledge, 141 S. Ct at 480; see also Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.
270
See Fuse Brown & McCuskey, supra note 265, at 393.
265
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son’s choice” for the employer, forcing the employer to change or drop its
employee health plan in favor of the public option plan.271 A state law that
imposes such a forced choice on the employer would be preempted.
State public option plans avoid ERISA preemption because they simply
offer the state plan as a voluntary option to employers. Compared to a single-payer plan, a public option more clearly and readily preserves for employers the choice of maintaining their employee benefit plans, which should
place them on firmer ground under ERISA than single-payer plans. Unlike
state single-payer plans, which nearly all rely on payroll taxes either alone or
together with income taxes or other individual assessments,272 the Comprehensive public option plans use a more diverse set of funding mechanisms
and vary in their reliance on employers to collect, remit, and pay for their
employees’ enrollment in the state public option plan. After all, neither the
employees nor the employers are required to participate in the state public
option plan. Yet a more granular examination of the various funding mechanisms employed by particular public option proposals is necessary to determine whether they would avoid ERISA preemption.
For example, a Comprehensive public option like New Jersey’s A.B.
1343 would rely on individual premiums.273 A state-assessed individual premium would not implicate ERISA because it does not target employers, and,
unless the employer is required to collect the premium from its employees,
does not involve the employer at all.274 The problem with a premium-only
model is that the state might not capture all the current employer expenditure
on health benefits. Currently, employers pay eighty-three percent of the premiums for individual coverage and seventy-three percent for family coverage.275 Although the employer contribution comes out of the employee’s
wages, the premium that an employee experiences is only a small fraction of
the total cost.276
271

See id. at 433.
See id. at Table 2, 413 (finding that 45 of 66 state single-payer proposals contained a
funding mechanism including payroll taxes).
273
A.B. 1343, 218th Leg., 2018–2019 Reg. Sess. § 10.c. (N.J. 2018); see also H.146,
2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1806 (3)(c) (Vt. 2011) (requiring employers to deduct premiums upon
request, presumably of the employee).
274
See, e.g., Vt. H. 146 § 1806 (3)(c) (requiring employers to deduct premiums upon
request, presumably of the employee).
275
See GARY CLAXTON, MATTHEW RAE, GREGORY YOUNG & DANIEL MCDERMOTT, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 2020 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 81 (2020), http://files.kff.org/
attachment/Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-2020-Annual-Survey.pdf [perma.cc/9K5622B9].
276
See generally Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance and the Labor Market (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 6762, 1998) (reviewing the empirical literature and finding
“a fairly uniform result: the costs of health insurance are fully shifted to wages”); Matthew
Rae, Rebecca Copeland & Cynthia Cox, Tracking the Rise in Premium Contributions and
Cost-Sharing for Families with Large Employer Coverage, PETERSON-KFF HEALTH SYS.
TRACKER (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/tracking-the-rise-in-premium-contributions-and-cost-sharing-for-families-with-large-employer-coverage/ [https://
perma.cc/S446-AUCG]; Economic News Release: Table 3 Medical Plans: Share of Premiums
Paid by Employer and Employee for Single Coverage, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://
272
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If a state public option were to rely solely on individual premiums
rather than payroll taxes, it would lack a mechanism to capture the employer’s share of the cost of coverage. But requiring the employer to pay a
percentage of the employee’s public option premium or even collect and remit the employee’s premium share could potentially amount to an impermissible employer mandate that would be preempted by ERISA.277 Thus, the
employer’s contribution to or collection of premiums should be voluntary to
avoid entanglement with ERISA.
Other Comprehensive public option plans would rely on payroll taxes
to fund the public option and capture the employer health benefit expenditures, raising the question of whether these payroll taxes would be preempted by ERISA. Bills in Vermont and Washington278 would rely on a
combination of premiums and payroll taxes to fund their public option plans.
Vermont would assess a payroll tax on the employer, calculated as a percentage of an employee’s gross wages with no exemption for employers that
offered employer-based coverage.279 While Vermont’s bills do not prohibit
employers from offering employer-based coverage, they would not allow
individuals to have plans with overlapping coverage, only supplemental.280
The mandatory payroll taxes in Vermont’s H.B. 146 and H.B. 88 are unlikely
to implicate ERISA (as they do not regulate an ERISA plan),281 and the public option plan would provide employers with a meaningful choice between
maintaining their own plans or the state plan, thus avoiding a preempted
forced choice.282
Washington’s S.B. 5222 would impose a payroll tax of 10.5% of wages.
But, the bill would exempt from the payroll tax those employers that maintained a benefit plan at least as comprehensive and affordable as the state
plan.283 ERISA might preempt a bald “maintenance of effort” requirement
that imposes a state mandate on the employer’s administration of its plan, but
here instead the maintenance of effort provision appears as a condition of the
www.bls.gov/news.release/ebs2.t03.htm [https://perma.cc/S6EX-D7HH] (last modified Sept.
20, 2019).
277
Compare H. 88, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2104 (Vt. 2015) (requiring employers to deduct employee premiums for the state public option plan or other health coverage as prescribed
by the state) with S.B. 5222, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. § 208 (Wash. 2019) (providing that
employers may withhold and remit premiums for employees). See Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 255, 292 (1990) (stating that “state level employer mandates” are preempted).
278
Wash. S.B. 5222. Note, this is a different, more comprehensive bill than the public
option that ultimately passed in 2019, Wash. S.B. 5526.
279
H. 146 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2011) § 2103 (establishing a ten percent payroll tax);
Vt. H. 88 § 2103 (establishing an eight percent payroll tax for employers and four percent for
employees).
280
Vt. H. 146 § 1808(f); Vt. H. 88, § 1856(f).
281
Payroll taxes are calculated on the basis of wages, not on the value of health benefits.
282
See N.Y. State Conf. of B.C.B.S. Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 664 (1995).
Some uncertainty remains whether a ten percent payroll tax would be high enough to create a
Hobson’s choice and force employers to drop or alter their own employer-based plan. Id.
283
Wash. S.B. 5222 § 126.
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exemption from the state’s payroll tax. Thus, employers have choices; they
can: (1) pay the payroll tax and drop their plan; (2) offer a plan at least as
generous and affordable as the state plan and qualify for an exemption from
the payroll tax; or (3) offer a skimpier or more expensive plan and pay the
payroll tax. Because it offers employers at least three viable options, the WA
S.B. 5222 bill would likely survive an ERISA challenge.284
Finally, some Comprehensive public option plans do not rely on payroll
or income taxes at all. This premium-only financing model is illustrated by
Massachusetts’ MBPO proposals, under which the state would offer a health
plan on its Marketplace to individuals, small groups, and large employers
with more than fifty employees.285 An employer could offer employees coverage under the state plan the way it normally would purchase health insurance or it could offer employees a voucher to shop for coverage among the
options on the Marketplace. Either way, the state does not dictate the employer’s choice of plan or whether or how much of employees’ premiums the
employer will pay. Because it does not impinge on employers’ health benefit
choices, a purely premium-financed public option would not implicate ERISA at all. However, a public option financed entirely through premiums
may not raise sufficient funds for the state to provide additional subsidies to
those who find the plan unaffordable.
To the extent that all state public option plans are more “optional” for
employers than a state single-payer plan, they would all be on surer footing
under ERISA than their single-payer cousins. Some Comprehensive public
option plans that we studied are closer to one end of the spectrum between a
mandate and an option. The more a state makes its public option plan, including the financing mechanism, truly optional on the part of employers
and preserves a system for the employer to continue to offer its own health
plan, the lower the risk of ERISA preemption.
One tradeoff, though, is that improving a state public option plan’s resistance to ERISA preemption reduces its momentum toward broad systemic
change. Mandatory payroll taxes without exceptions accelerate the glidepath toward single-payer because employers and employees will have significant incentives not to double-pay for both employer- and state-based coverage, and may quickly stop offering and purchasing employer coverage if
they are eligible to enroll in public coverage that is at least as comprehensive
and affordable.286 The more exceptions and optionality that a state public
option presents to employers, the less of a threat ERISA preemption becomes. Yet maintaining options also increases the chance that the market
will remain fragmented and stratified by income, wealth, health, employ284
See Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 646–47 (9th Cir.
2008) (holding a municipal pay-or-play law was not preempted because, by offering a meaningful coverage alternative, it did not force the employers to adopt or change their health
plans).
285
H.B. 1228, 187th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Mass. 2011).
286
See Fuse Brown & McCuskey, supra note 265, at 404.
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ment status, race, or other socio-economic variables that undermine solidarity and risk spreading.287 Another tradeoff in reducing the threat of ERISA
preemption is that the state may fail to fully capture a large and deep source
of health expenditures from employers. As a result, the state may lose some
of its ability to raise revenues or pool risk in the volumes necessary to extend coverage to those parts of the market that are difficult to reach under
current legal and political constraints—namely, undocumented immigrants
who are ineligible for coverage on the Marketplace or under Medicaid.288
2. Federal Tax Law
The second legal issue Comprehensive public option plans confront are
limitations in their financing mechanisms posed by federal tax law. As described above, to finance a Comprehensive public option plan, state bills
propose varying combinations of payroll taxes, personal income taxes, and
premium payments. Currently, employers can deduct their spending on employee health benefits as a business expense,289 and health insurance benefits
are likewise excluded from employees’ taxable income and federal payroll
taxes.290 This foregone federal tax revenue is a form of federal spending,
subsidizing the cost of employer-provided health coverage to the tune of
$273 billion in 2019.291
There are two major tax-related challenges for Comprehensive public
option plans. First, states may try to capture not only what employers spend
on health benefits, but also the hefty federal tax subsidies for employersponsored health benefits. How can states preserve employers’ existing tax
advantage for health benefit spending under current federal law or draw
upon even a fraction of the billions in federal tax expenditures? Second, to
the extent that states levy additional individual taxes—such as an employee’s
share of payroll taxes—to pay for the public option plan, the new state taxes
must contend with the cap on state and local tax deductions (SALT) under
the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. The answers depend on the type of financing mechanism used and who is paying for it: employer-paid payroll taxes;
employee-paid payroll taxes; or employer or individual premiums.
State payroll taxes levied on employers to finance Comprehensive public option plans would largely preserve the existing tax benefits for employer-based health spending. The employer-portion of state payroll taxes
used to finance a public option plan would be treated like federal payroll
taxes or state unemployment taxes, so these employer-paid state payroll
287
See Erin Fuse Brown, Matthew Lawrence, Elizabeth McCuskey & Lindsay Wiley, Social Solidarity in Health Care, American-Style, 48 J.L. MED. ETHICS 411, 423 (2020).
288
See Fuse Brown & McCuskey, supra note 265, at Section I.B.
289
I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
290
Id. § 162(l)(1) (discussing deductions for self-employed individuals).
291
See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS
2019–2023 (2020), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5238 [https://
perma.cc/7SHJ-G84G].

R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\59-1\HLL104.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 51

Are State Public Option Health Plans Worth It?

14-FEB-22

12:23

195

taxes would be excluded from employees’ taxable income and deductible as
business expenses to the employer.292 To the extent the payroll taxes approximate the employer’s spending on health benefits, the employer-paid state
payroll taxes would roughly retain the existing federal tax advantage for
employer health spending.293
However, if the state levies payroll taxes on employees or income taxes
on individuals, the existing tax advantage for employees’ health spending
would be lost. Currently, employees’ share of their health plan premiums are
excluded from their taxable income and federal payroll taxes.294 Some states’
public option proposals would levy taxes on employees’ wages to finance the
public plan, perhaps to replicate the current split between employer- and
employee-contributions to health insurance premiums.295 Although an employee’s share of state payroll taxes would be deductible to the employee, it
would be subject to a $10,000 cap on SALT deductions.296 The SALT cap
effectively increases the tax liability for higher income earners in high income-tax states by limiting the amount of SALT deductions the individual
may take.297 The employee’s portion of payroll taxes used to finance a public
option plan would be added to other state and local taxes, such as income or
property taxes, for purposes of the SALT cap, limiting the deductibility of
these tax obligations for the employee.298 For example, if a single individual
paid $3,000 in local property taxes, $7,000 in state income taxes, and $6,000
for the public option plan, the SALT cap would limit the individual’s deduction on state and local taxes to the $10,000 allowed maximum, despite the
fact that the individual incurred $16,000 in state and local taxes (including
the cost to the individual for the public option plan).
States also depend on premiums to finance their public option plans.
The question is whether premium payments for the state plan would be subject to the SALT cap. In 2020, the average annual premium was $7,470 for
292

See I.R.C. § 162(a) (allowing employers to deduct payroll taxes as business expenses).
See White et al., supra note 222, at xiv (assessing tax impact of a state payroll tax to
finance a single-payer plan and noting, “Currently, employer spending on health benefits is
excluded from taxable income for federal income and payroll taxes, creating an implicit subsidy for state residents with employer-sponsored coverage. Under the Single Payer option,
employers would no longer make tax-advantaged premium payments and would instead pay
the new state payroll tax. Those employer-paid payroll taxes would, like employer Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) contributions, be excluded from employees’ taxable income, which would roughly preserve the current tax advantage.”).
294
See I.R.C. §§ 106, 3121.
295
See, e.g., H. 88, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2015) (assessing a four percent payroll tax
on employees in addition to an eight percent payroll tax on employers); S.B. 5222, 66th Leg.,
2019 Reg. Sess. § 203 (Wash. 2019) (assessing a two percent payroll tax on employees in
addition to a 10.5% payroll tax on employers).
296
See I.R.C. §§ 164(a)(1), (b)(2) (addressing the deductibility of state and local taxes);
I.R.C. § 164(b)(6).
297
See Wiley, supra note 16, at 884; How Does the Deduction for State and Local Taxes
Work?, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/howdoes-deduction-state-and-local-taxes-work [http://perma.cc/SBD5-QZZA].
298
See I.R.C. § 164(b)(6)(B) (aggregating all state and local taxes for purposes of applying the SALT cap).
293

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\59-1\HLL104.txt

196

unknown

Seq: 52

Harvard Journal on Legislation

14-FEB-22

12:23

[Vol. 59

individual coverage and $21,342 for family coverage.299 For taxpayers with
significant medical expenses, the tax-deductibility of the health insurance
premiums has a significant impact on their finances and their coverage
choices. Generally, individuals can deduct their health insurance premium
costs if they itemize deductions and if their premium and out-of-pocket medical expenses exceed ten percent of their adjusted gross income in a given
year.300 Unlike income or payroll taxes, premium payments may not be considered state or local taxes subject to the SALT cap. Because the public
option plan is, in fact, optional, only individuals who elect to enroll in the
public plan must pay the premiums. In this way, the premiums are distinguishable from individual income or payroll taxes, which are universally
assessed. By contrast, premiums are only remitted by those who are paying
to obtain coverage under the public plan.
If employers pay their employees’ premiums in order to enroll in the
state public option plan, the premium payments would be deductible to the
employer as a business expense, no different than premium payments for
any insurance plan.301
Thus, a state public option financed primarily with an employer payroll
tax preserves the tax advantage of the status quo, but raises greater ERISA
questions, whereas shifting more of the financing to the individual taxes potentially raises the tax burden particularly for high- or even moderate-income earners. States looking to enact a robust, comprehensive public option
that is adopted by private employers and employees and raises revenues for
more generous premium subsidies should rely on a combination of employer
payroll taxes and individual premiums (rather than individual income or
payroll taxes) to finance the public option plan, navigate the maze of ERISA
preemption, and preserve the current tax advantages for employer-based
health benefits.
D. Administration
Comprehensive public option plans generally call for the creation of a
new, publicly administered health plan. State administration is most common, but a state could allow the state agency to contract with a private health
insurance company to administer the public option plan.302 Comprehensive
299
Gary Claxton, Matthew Rae, Gregory Young, Daniel McDermott, Heidi Whitmore,
Jason Kerns, Jackie Cifuentes, Anthony Damico & Larry Strange, 2020 Employer Health Benefits Survey, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs2020-section-1-cost-of-health-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/L3FL-JDCT].
300
See I.R.C. § 213 (the threshold is 7.5% of adjusted gross income in 2019 and 2020 tax
years and increases to ten percent in subsequent years).
301
See I.R.C. § 162.
302
See H. 88, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1852(a) (Vt. 2015) (“The Agency of Human Services shall establish Vermont Care, a public health care coverage option for all Vermont residents . . . . The Agency may establish Vermont Care directly or through a contract with a
health insurer to act as the third-party administrator.”).
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plans seek bolder disruption and social solidarity—not simply offering a
fallback option if a resident becomes uninsured, but rather creating a single
plan to cover an increasingly broad swath of the state’s residents.303 The state
sees itself as creating and administering a new public program of health
coverage rather than expanding existing programs to patch holes in dysfunctional market segments.
To access federal subsidies, Comprehensive plans would have to be offered on the Marketplace. The broadest versions of these plans conceived of
the Marketplace being subsumed into the state plan via a Section 1332
waiver (allowing those eligible for Marketplace subsidies to use them to
enroll in the public option plan) rather than attempting to offer the state plan
as one of the options on the Marketplace.304 While these broad proposals
faced political hurdles under the Trump administration,305 the Biden administration may be more welcoming of such a bold use of Section 1332 waivers.
A more modest variant of the Comprehensive public option plan could
be sold on the Marketplaces as an MBPO offered to large group enrollees.306
The state could create and administer a Comprehensive public option plan,
essentially entering the market as a public insurer, and design the plan to be
offered both on and off the Marketplace.307 However, offering the plan on
the Marketplace would inevitably fragment the market and risk pools, sacrificing the administrative simplification and cost savings achieved through a
single risk pool and unified state public option plan.308

303
See, e.g., A.B. 1343, 218th Leg., 2018–2019 Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.J. 2018) (declaring, “It
is the intent of the Legislature to create the New Jersey Public Option Health Care Program to
provide a universal health plan option available to every New Jerseyan.”).
304
See, e.g., H.B. 6285, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 402 (Mich. 2018) (“As soon as allowed
under federal law, the director shall seek a waiver to allow this state to suspend operation of
the exchange and to enable this state to receive the appropriate federal fund contribution in lieu
of the federal premium tax credits, cost-sharing subsidies, and small business tax credits provided in the federal act.”); N.J. A.B. 1343 § 9.b.
305
See State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 83 Fed. Reg. 53,575 (Oct. 24, 2018);
Jennifer Tolbert & Karen Pollitz, New Rules for Section 1332 Waivers: Changes and Implications, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/
new-rules-for-section-1332-waivers-changes-and-implications/ [https://perma.cc/Z7BMSMGF] (“By prioritizing private coverage over public programs, the new guidance appears to
make it more difficult for states to obtain waivers that would build on Medicaid, adopt a public
plan option in the marketplace, or create a single payer plan.”).
306
See, e.g., S.B. 697, 191st Gen. Ct., 2019–2020 Sess. § 2 (Mass. 2019).
307
See S.B. 5222, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. §§ 112(6), 115 (Wash. 2019). Washington’s
S.B. 5222 (2018) contemplates that the state public option plan could be offered on the Marketplace until a waiver is obtained and the entire Marketplace is folded into the state plan.
308
Fragmentation would persist between separate risk pools for individuals that seek coverage on the Marketplace and those ineligible for Marketplace coverage, like those with employer-based coverage or government-sponsored coverage.
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E. Financial Considerations
1. Financing Sources
As with all public option plans, there are three main sources of financing for Comprehensive public option plans: (1) premiums and cost-sharing;
(2) federal funds, including Marketplace premium tax credits and Medicaid
matching funds; and (3) state revenues from payroll and other taxes. The
first two sources, premiums and premium tax credits, are the most common,
but tax revenues may be necessary for the state to provide additional premium subsidies to individuals or populations who may be underserved by or
ineligible for federal premium tax credits on the Marketplaces.
Many of the Comprehensive public option proposals would be financed
by individual premiums and cost-sharing established by the administering
agency or a contractor, though some populations may be exempt from these
requirements.309 Plans offered on the Marketplaces would have to follow the
ACA’s premium requirements, which include modified community rating.310
State bills to establish Comprehensive public option plans generally
seek to draw down federal sources of funding and pool these with premiums
and state tax revenues to finance the plan. They typically authorize state
administrators to seek federal waivers as needed to collect ACA premium
tax credits, federal pass-through funds from the Marketplaces, Medicaid
matching funds, and other federal funds to enroll these populations in the
state plan.311 In reality, however, the Marketplace premium tax credits and
pass-through funds are a more feasible source of federal funding than Medicaid matching funds, due to legal constraints described above.312 Like
MBPOs, a Comprehensive public option plan can be designed to tap into the
extensive federal premium tax credits to finance the plan when offered on
the Marketplace.313
Unlike MBPOs, Comprehensive plans can capture employers’ and individuals’ expenditures to finance large group coverage in the public option
plan. To finance large groups’ participation, Comprehensive plans (like their
single-payer cousins) can draw upon a combination of payroll taxes on employers and premiums or income taxes for employees.314 Payroll taxes create
incentives for employers and employees to switch to the public option plan
309
See, e.g., S.B. 5222, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. §§ 111, 112 (Wash. 2019); S. 1947,
219th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6.a (N.J. 2020).
310
See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
311
See, e.g., A.B. 1343, 218th Leg., 2018–2019 Reg. Sess. § 9.b (N.J. 2018); H.B. 1104,
66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. § 7 (Wash. 2019) (“The board shall . . . seek all necessary waivers
so that current federal and state payments for health services to residents will be paid directly
to the trust.”).
312
See discussion supra Section I.B.
313
See, e.g., S.B. 697, 191st Gen. Ct., 2019–2020 Sess. § 2 (Mass. 2019) (offering the
public option exclusively on the state Marketplace).
314
See, e.g., H.B. 6285, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 402 (Mich. 2018).
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(to avoid double-paying for coverage), but employers may hesitate to pay for
employees to obtain public option coverage if they remain subject to the
ACA’s employer mandate penalties. Thus, if a state includes a payroll tax,
obtaining a Section 1332 waiver of employer mandate penalties is advisable.315 State tax revenues may also be necessary for the state to finance additional premium subsidies beyond those available on the Marketplaces or
cover the remaining uninsured, particularly undocumented immigrants who
are not eligible for Medicaid, Medicare, or Marketplace premium tax credits.
Washington and Vermont had bills that called for a combination of all
three sources: (1) premiums; (2) federal premium tax credits for Marketplace
plans; and (3) tax revenues. Washington’s bills called for a funding plan that
included a 10.5% payroll tax on employers (called a “health security assessment”), an 8.5% long-term capital gains tax, a 2% personal income tax
(called a “personal health assessment”), premiums, cost-sharing, and federal
health care funding.316
The evolution of Vermont’s public option bills from 2011 to 2017 demonstrates the evolution in policymaker thinking on financing possibilities. In
2011, Vermont passed a single-payer plan and also proposed H. 146, a public option to be offered to all residents that combined the state’s Medicaid,
Marketplace, and large group market into a single public plan with a shared
risk pool.317 The bill relied on a complex financing formula including a ten
percent payroll tax, individual and employer premiums, Medicaid funds (necessitating a Medicaid Section 1115 waiver), federal premium tax credits, an
assortment of taxes on sugary foods and cigarettes, and penalties for noncompliance with the state’s individual mandate.318 Only Medicare beneficiaries were ineligible to participate in the state plan. After the state’s single
payer plan fell apart in 2014,319 a similarly broad public option was re-introduced in 2015.320 The 2015 bill (H.B. 88) was financed by a 12% payroll tax
(8% on employers and 4% on employees), individual premiums, federal
Medicaid funds and Marketplace premium tax credits, and penalties for noncompliance with the state’s individual mandate.321 By the 2017 legislative
session, Vermont’s public option bill had been scaled back significantly. It
relied primarily on employer and individual premiums, federal premium tax
315
See, e.g., H. 88, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1811 (Vt. 2015) (requiring the state to apply
for a waiver of the employer responsibility requirement of the ACA).
316
S.B. 5222, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. §§ 117, 202, 203 (Wash. 2019). Another public
option bill in Washington in 2019 included a similar set of funding sources, except it did not
include a long-term capital gains tax. See Wash. H.B. 1104 §§ 16, 18.
317
See H. 146, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2011).
318
Id. § 1812 (drawing upon revenues from taxes on candy, sugary beverages, and
cigarettes).
319
See John E. McDonough, The Demise of Vermont’s Single-Payer Plan, 372 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1584, 1584 (2015).
320
See H. 88, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1860 (Vt. 2015).
321
Id. (setting forth financing sources for the Vermont Care Trust Fund); id. § 2 (discussing federal waivers under Sections 1115 and 1332); id. §§ 2103–04 (setting forth the employer
and employee payroll taxes and premium payments).
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credits, and, in lieu of an explicit payroll tax, a vague reference to other
revenues “generated by a public funding mechanism” to be established by
the legislature at a later date.322 The 2017 bill eliminated the Medicaid population from public option eligibility and as a funding source. By narrowing
its scope, the 2017 Vermont public option bill avoided the legal complexities
of Medicaid waiver, the political difficulty of imposing new payroll taxes,
and a new federal administration hostile to waiver applications to expand
public coverage.
Michigan stands out as the only state in our dataset that relied entirely
on taxes to finance its public option plan, prohibiting the use of premiums
and cost-sharing.323 In this regard, the Michigan public option financing most
closely resembles state single-payer proposals, which more commonly rely
on tax-financing and eschew cost-sharing and even premiums.324
2. Cost Control
As noted above, constraining payments to health care providers is the
primary mechanism for public option plans to control costs. Lower costs for
health care services translate to lower premiums and exert downward pressure on premiums in the health insurance market. Comprehensive public option plans generally use one of two approaches to control health care
payment rates: administrative rate setting or centralized negotiations with
providers.
Administrative rate setting typically pegs provider payments to a federal benchmark, such as Medicare rates. Michigan’s H.B. 6285, for example,
would set provider payment rates at 110% of Medicare and payment rates
for drugs and devices at 100% of the rate paid by the Department of Veterans Affairs.325 Similarly, Vermont’s H. 88 would pay providers at 110% of
Medicare rates.326 In other instances, Comprehensive public option bills do
not set rates or tie them to Medicare, but rather authorize state officials or
the governing board to establish payment rates via negotiation with providers.327 These negotiations potentially offer providers more ability to maintain
higher payment rates, closer to private insurance rates, which typically pay
providers about double what Medicare pays.328

322

H.B. 28, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1855 (Vt. 2017).
H.B. 6285, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 405(3) (Mich. 2018) (“MIcare must not include
premiums or cost-sharing requirements.”). H.B. 6285 was introduced and referred to the Committee on Health Policy in August 2018, but the bill never made it out of Committee. Id.
324
See Fuse Brown & McCuskey, supra note 265, at 399 (describing how most state
single-payer proposals feature low or no cost-sharing).
325
Mich. H.B. 6285 § 306(5)–(6) (Mich. 2018).
326
H. 88, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1859(b) (Vt. 2015).
327
See, e.g., A.B. 1343, 218th Leg., 2018–2019 Reg. Sess. §§ 7.c–d (N.J. 2018); S.B.
5222, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. §§ 09(2), 110(1) (Wash. 2019).
328
See Eric Lopez, Tricia Neuman, Gretchen Jacobson & Larry Levitt, How Much More
Than Medicare Do Private Insurers Pay? A Review of the Literature, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
323
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Provider rate controls are not the only ways public option plans save
money. They also promise improvements in administrative efficiency. Comprehensive plans offer greater potential for administrative simplification than
the narrower Marketplace-based plans or Buy-In models because Comprehensive plans further reduce fragmentation of the health insurance market
and unify administration for many market segments into one body.
F. Market Effects
Comprehensive state public option plans are close cousins of statebased single-payer plans in terms of their aims, scope, and financing.329 The
main difference is that public option plans explicitly contemplate or anticipate that private employer-based coverage will continue to exist alongside
the public option plan.330 To the extent the plans reference employers at all,
the state would offer private employers or employees an option to obtain
coverage under the state public option plan either in lieu of or in addition to
existing employer-based plans.331 Nevertheless, the market for private coverage may be disrupted by the entrance of a public plan that will compete with
private plans on the basis of comprehensiveness of benefits, cost, and provider network.332 The extent of disruption to the private health insurance
market depends on several factors, such as the breadth of the provider network, the strength of provider rate controls, ease of enrollment, whether employers or employees must contribute to financing the public plan if
employers offer private coverage, and whether it would preserve the same
tax advantage as current plans.333
(Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/how-much-more-than-medicare-doprivate-insurers-pay-a-review-of-the-literature/ [https://perma.cc/JKB9-S9VR].
329
For example, Michigan’s H.B. 6285 is a public option plan whose policy goals are
nearly indistinguishable from a single-payer plan, providing that “all residents of this state are
eligible for [the state plan] MIcare, a universal health care program that will provide health
care coverage through a single payment system.” H.B. 6285, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 202
(Mich. 2018); see also S.B. 5222, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. § 101 (Wash. 2019) (providing
that “[a]ll residents of the state of Washington are eligible for coverage through this
chapter.”).
330
For example, the Michigan public option bill explicitly permits individuals to maintain
alternate sources of coverage: “This chapter does not require an individual with health coverage other than MIcare to terminate that coverage.” Mich. H.B. 6285 § 408.
331
See, e.g., id. § 202 (“MIcare includes health care coverage provided under Medicaid,
under Medicare, under MIChild, by employers that choose to participate, and to state and local
government employees including public school employees.”) (emphasis added); Vt. H. 88
§ 1853 (“An individual may enroll in Vermont Care regardless of whether the individual’s
employer offers health insurance for which the individual is eligible.”).
332
See, e.g., Margot Sanger-Katz, Why the Less Disruptive Health Care Option Could Be
Plenty Disruptive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/upshot/
public-option-medicare-for-all.html [https://perma.cc/VTZ6-YT3L] (discussing the disruptive effect of a federal public option plan).
333
See Fuse Brown et al., supra note 287, at 422; see also Sanger-Katz, supra note 332;
Matthew Yglesias, Joe Biden’s Health Care Plan, Explained, VOX (July 16, 2019), https://
www.vox.com/2019/7/16/20694598/joe-biden-health-care-plan-public-option [https://
perma.cc/BAC9-7DD8].
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2021 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

While outside the scope of our original survey, 2021 was an active year
for state public option plans. In the 2021 legislative session, twelve bills
were introduced in eleven states to implement a public option health plan.334
All of these bills fit into the taxonomy described in Parts I–III, with six
states introducing Medicaid buy-ins,335 five states introducing MBPOs,336
and one state introducing a comprehensive public option plan.337 Most states
introducing bills had introduced similar public option bills in previous sessions, but three states—Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee—introduced public option bills for the first time in 2021, all of which were
Medicaid buy-in plans.338 As with prior years, most bills failed to pass or
advance out of committee, but Nevada and Colorado enacted an MBPO in
2021.339 In addition, the 2021 Washington legislature strengthened its public
option plan by authorizing the Insurance Commissioner to require certain
hospitals to contract with at least one public option plan340 and eliminating
the Commissioner’s ability to waive the cap on provider rates at 160% of
Medicare rates.341 The successful 2021 bills in Nevada, Colorado, and Washington demonstrate the continuing traction of state public option legislation.
Nevada nearly implemented a Medicaid buy-in public option in 2017,342
but the passage of an MBPO-type public option in 2021, S.B. 420, shows an
334
See H.B. 21-1232, 73d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021); S.B. 842, 2021
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2021); S.B. 83, 156th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021);
S.B. 787, 192d Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2021); S.B. 420, 2021 Leg., 81st Sess. (Nev. 2021);
A.B. 5029, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2021); H.B. 1808, 58th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2021);
H.B. 3573, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2021); S.B. 418, 2021 Leg., 112th Sess.
(Tenn. 2021); H.B. 602, 2021 Leg., 112th Sess. (Tenn. 2021); H.B. 4984, 2021 Leg., 87th Sess.
(Tex. 2021); H.B. 512, 2021 Leg., 87th Sess. (Tex. 2021); H.B. 3001, 2021 Reg. Sess. (W.V.
2021). Note that West Virginia also introduced H.B. 2241, but because the bill is so similar to
H.B. 3001, we count West Virginia as introducing one bill.
335
S.B. 83, 156th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021); H.B. 1808, 58th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Okla. 2021); H.B. 3573, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2021); S.B. 418, 2021 Leg.,
112th Sess. (Tenn. 2021); H.B. 602, 2021 Leg., 112th Sess. (Tenn. 2021); H.B. 4984, 2021
Leg., 87th Sess. (Tex. 2021); H.B. 512, 2021 Leg., 87th Sess. (Tex. 2021); H.B. 3001, 2021
Reg. Sess. (W.V. 2021).
336
H.B. 21-1232, 73d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021); S.B. 842, 2021 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2021); S.B. 787, 192d Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2021); S.B.
420, 2021 Leg., 81st Sess. (Nev. 2021).
337
A.B. 5029, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2021).
338
H.B. 1808, 58th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2021); H.B. 3573, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (S.C. 2021); S.B. 418, 2021 Leg., 112th Sess. (Tenn. 2021); H.B. 602, 2021 Leg., 112th
Sess. (Tenn. 2021).
339
H.B. 21-1232, 73d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021); S.B. 420, 2021 Leg.,
81st Sess. (Nev. 2021).
340
See S.B. 5377, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Wash. 2021). The requirement applies to
hospitals that serve patients from the public employee or school employee benefit plans or
Medicaid. This provision was designed to address the poor hospital participation in the public
option, which led to only twenty of thirty-nine counties offering a public option plan. See
supra text accompanying notes 218–19.
341
S.B. 5377, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6(2)(g)(ii) (Wash. 2021).
342
See discussion supra Part I.
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evolution in public option design. Specifically, S.B. 420 requires the public
option to be sold both on and off the marketplace and to be available to all
state residents starting on January 1, 2026.343 The law requires the state Director of Health and Human Services to apply for a waiver from HHS to
obtain federal pass-through funds344 and authorizes the Director to apply for
a waiver to combine risk pools for the public option and Medicaid, if doing
so would lower costs.345 If Nevada is able to combine its Medicaid MCO and
public option plans in this way, the public option would be a hybrid MBPO/
Medicaid buy-in plan, perhaps reflecting its 2017 origins and aiming to reduce churn on and off Medicaid. S.B. 420 also grants the Director broad
discretion about how to implement the public option, including whether to
directly administer the plan or to contract with a health carrier to do so and
whether to offer it to small employers or their employees.346 Recognizing
that there are tradeoffs between a public-private partnership and direct administration of the public option, the Nevada law requires all carriers offering a Medicaid-managed care plan to submit a “good faith proposal” for a
public option plan, then allows the Director to choose one of those plans or
to implement the public option directly.347 Rather than impose provider rate
caps on the public option, the Nevada law requires its premiums be at least
five percent cheaper than a reference premium and limits future premium
increases to the Medicare Economic Index.348 This premium cap gives the
public option plan broad flexibility in how to control costs, but the premium
limits appear to end on January 1, 2030, potentially leaving Nevada without
mandatory cost controls after 2030.349 The Nevada public option also sets a
payment floor commensurate with Medicare rates for most provider reimbursements.350 Finally, to ensure adequate provider participation in the public
option, Nevada’s law requires all providers that participate in the Public Employees’ Benefits Program to enroll in at least one public option plan and to
accept public option patients equitably compared to other patients.351
The strengths of Nevada’s public option legislation are the significant
flexibility given to state agencies to design and implement the public option

343

S.B. 420, 2021 Leg., 81st Sess. § 41 (Nev. 2021).
Id. § 11.
Id. § 11(1)(b)(1).
346
See id. § 10.
347
See id. §§ 12(1), 12(2), 12(5).
348
Id. §§ 10(4), 10(6)(d) (defining the “Reference premium” as “for any zip code, the
lower of: (1) The premium for the second-lowest cost silver level plan available through the
Exchange in the zip code during the 2024 plan year, adjusted by the percentage change in the
Medicare Economic Index between January 1, 2024, and January 1 of the year to which a
premium applies; or (2) The premium for the second-lowest cost silver level plan available
through the Exchange in the zip code during the year immediately preceding the year to which
a premium applies.”).
349
See id. §§ 38, 41 (removing the premium controls for the public option plan effective
January 1, 2030).
350
See id. § 14(2)–(5).
351
See id. §§ 13, 21, 29.
344
345
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plan, including the authority to administer the plan directly, and the provider
participation requirements. This strength from flexibility may be undermined, however, by the lack of permanent statutory provider or premium
rate controls necessary to achieve the public option’s central aim of cost
control. Additionally, the long five-year runway to implementation gives the
state many opportunities to kill the public option in the face of unfavorable
actuarial or budgetary analyses or overwhelming political opposition from
industry.
In 2021, the Colorado legislature passed H.B. 21-1232,352 a bill that
reflects significant modifications from earlier years’ models. The extent of
concession and delegation to private insurers and providers begs the question of whether the law can fairly be called a “public option.”353 All mention
of public option plans was eliminated from the law.354 Instead, the legislation
requires all carriers that offer a health plan in the individual and small-group
market to also offer a standardized health benefit plan in the same county
both on and off the Marketplace beginning in 2023.355 Its benefit design is
similar to earlier years’ proposals for the Colorado Public Option Plan.356
Furthermore, the standardized plans are entirely privately administered and
lack the defining feature of publicly-determined provider rates except under
limited circumstances.357 Instead of imposing state-established provider rate
caps, the 2021 bill relies upon premium constraints, leaving private carriers
to negotiate health care reimbursement rates with health care providers to
achieve the mandated premium savings.358 Beginning in 2023, premiums for
the standardized plans must decrease five percent per year compared with
inflation-adjusted 2021 rates until they achieve a fifteen percent reduction
overall in 2025.359 As a fallback, the Commissioner may set provider reimbursement rates only for hospitals and health systems that prevent a carrier
from meeting specified premium rate reductions or meeting network adequacy requirements (by refusing to negotiate their own rate reductions or
participate), but state-imposed rates for hospital services cannot be lower
than 165% of Medicare rates.360 In addition, the 2021 law eliminated the
352

H.B. 21-1232, 73d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021).
See, e.g., Marianne Goodland, Public Option Bill, Now Just a Health Care Plan with
More Oversight, Approved by House Committee’s Democrats, COLO. POLS. (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://www.coloradopolitics.com/legislature/public-option-bill-now-just-a-health-care-planwith-more-oversightapprovedby-house/article_9ceefb20-a78c-11eb-b2d0-fb9e0559f168.html
[https://perma.cc/5LAS-79SD].
354
See id.
355
H.B. 21-1232, 73d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 1(10-16-1304(1)(c)) (Colo. 2021).
356
See id. §§ 1(10-16-1304–05) (requiring the Colorado Standardized Plans to cover pediatric care and other essential health benefits; offer bronze, silver, and gold levels of coverage;
be designed to improve racial health equity; and offer first-dollar, pre-deductible coverage for
certain services, such as primary health care and behavioral health care).
357
See id. § 10-16-1304(1).
358
Id. § 1(10-16-1305).
359
Id. § 1(10-16-1305(2)).
360
Id. § 1(10-16-1306(5)(a)). But see id. § 1(10-16-1306(4)(a)) (establishing a base rate of
155% Medicare rates and allowing add-ons for certain types of hospitals).
353
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override power of the Advisory Board.361 Overall, the 2021 version delegates
significantly more responsibility to private industry, but if the industry does
not achieve the legislature’s goals, the state can impose fines,362 reject premium requests,363 restrict reimbursement rates,364 and suspend the license of
any hospital that does not accept the standardized plan.365 Unlike Nevada’s
model, Colorado’s does not authorize the state to administer the plan directly
or combine risk pools with Medicaid, but rather imposes increasingly stringent requirements on private plans offered on and off the marketplace as
well as mechanisms to compel provider participation. Colorado’s new approach appears to more actively regulate insurance rates, akin to Rhode Island’s hospital rate caps via insurance rate regulation,366 coupled with
standardized plan requirements. The provider rate controls are considerably
more modest than even Washington’s, setting a floor for hospitals of 165%
of Medicare rates versus Washington’s ceiling of 160%, and only as a
fallback if private negotiations fail. But compared to Nevada’s five-year period, implementation in Colorado is a relatively quick two-year time frame.
The 2021 legislative session demonstrated the growth and evolution of
state public option bills. Perhaps learning from Washington’s struggle with
provider rate controls, the new state models lean on premium rate controls
and leave the negotiations of how to achieve these premium cuts to the industry players themselves. However, the new models also absorbed Washington’s lesson that providers must be made to participate in the public
option—carrots will not work as well as sticks. And the biggest stick is the
threat of greater state control over the public option plan and provider rates
if the private industry players cannot achieve the goals of coverage and cost
reduction on their own.
V. ARE STATE PUBLIC OPTION PLANS WORTH IT?
This project surveys and analyzes state legislative proposals since 2010
that aim to establish a public option plan as a health reform tool. Here is
361
Compare id. § 6 with H.B. 20-1349, 72d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (10-16-1204 (6))
(Colo. 2020) (stating that “the Board may override a decision of the Commissioner concerning
the development, implementation, and operation of the Colorado Option Plan by an affirmative
vote of at least seven of the voting members of the board.”).
362
Colo. H.B. 21-1232 § 6.
363
Id. § 2.
364
Id. § 1(10-16-1306(4)(I)).
365
Id. § 6.
366
See Johanna Butler, Insurance Rate Review as a Hospital Cost Containment Tool:
Rhode Island’s Experience, NAT’L ACAD. STATE HEALTH POL’Y (Feb. 1, 2021), https://
www.nashp.org/insurance-rate-review-as-a-hospital-cost-containment-tool-rhode-islands-experience/ [https://perma.cc/3L6Z-YYGB]; ROBERT BERENSON, JAIME KING, KATHERINE
GUDIKSEN, ROSLYN MURRAY & ADELE SHARTZER, URB. INST. & U.C. HASTINGS L., ADDRESSING HEALTH CARE MARKET CONSOLIDATION AND HIGH PRICES: THE ROLE OF THE STATES
54–56 (2020), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/101508/addressing_health_care_market_consolidation_and_high_prices_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/JLC7DPMF].
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what we have learned. First, “public option” means many different things to
different people.367 Notably, state public option plans differ from their federal counterparts in that they are not necessarily publicly financed; rather,
what makes them “public” is that they are state-initiated and that they impose state-mandated provider rate caps, even if the plan is administered by a
private contractor and financed from a variety of public and private sources.
Second, there are three main types of state public option plans, listed from
narrowest to broadest in scope: (1) Medicaid buy-in public option; (2) Marketplace-based public option; and (3) Comprehensive public option. The
type of plan a state should pursue depends on the state’s policy goals. Third,
and somewhat ironically, the degree of legal difficulty in establishing a state
public option plan is inversely related to the scope of the plan’s reach—the
broadest plans have surprisingly fewer legal hurdles than narrower plans,
though the broad plans may be more disruptive and politically difficult. This
Part assesses these tradeoffs and sets forth a menu of options for states to
help answer whether pursuing a public option as a health reform is worth it,
and, if so, which kind of public option to pursue.
A. A Public Option Road Map for States
1. Medicaid Buy-In Public Option
A Medicaid buy-in public option is best for states whose primary goal
is to provide access to difficult-to-cover, lower-income populations. These
groups include undocumented immigrants and those who earn too much for
Medicaid but for whom Marketplace coverage is unaffordable due to the
family glitch or the subsidy cliff.368 Offering a plan based on a Medicaidmanaged care plan would reduce coverage disruptions for those churning on
and off Medicaid and keep premiums affordable by reimbursing providers at
rates pegged to Medicaid. These populations may be well-served by a Medicaid-like plan because their health and social support needs may resemble
those of Medicaid beneficiaries.
Several constraints limit the scope of Medicaid buy-in plans. First, the
Medicaid statute does not permit non-eligible individuals to enroll directly in
Medicaid, and federal Medicaid matching funds cannot be used to pay for or
subsidize non-Medicaid enrollees. Medicaid buy-in thus typically means a
state would require its Medicaid-managed care plans to offer parallel plans
to the buy-in population, often on the Marketplace.369

367
We are not the first observers of state public option plans to note this. See Sparer, supra
note 37, at 262.
368
See supra Sections I.A, I.C.
369
See supra Section I.B.
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Second, if the state wants to cover undocumented immigrants, the
Medicaid buy-in plan cannot be offered solely on the Marketplace.370 This
means that a single Medicaid buy-in plan could not simultaneously create
cost competition on the Marketplace and cover undocumented immigrants.
A state could offer off- and on-Marketplace versions of the plan, but this
bifurcation would sacrifice the plan’s administrative simplification.
Another tradeoff is that paying Medicaid rates, which is necessary to
maintain the plan’s affordability, could also threaten provider participation,
limiting the scope of the Medicaid buy-in plan.371 Such a plan could never be
expanded to large groups, for example, without triggering widespread provider backlash and exit. Further, if offered on the Marketplace, the downward pressure in the market created by a Medicaid buy-in plan could drive
down premiums so much as to reduce the available subsidies on the rest of
the Marketplace, which would necessitate a Section 1332 waiver to capture
federal pass-through funds of amounts saved in lower premium subsidies.
Thus, for Medicaid buy-in plans, the state must face all the legal constraints
of the Medicaid program and the Marketplaces and thread the needle with
provider rates that are low enough to ensure affordability and high enough to
maintain sufficient provider participation to serve a larger portion of state
residents.
As a result, Medicaid buy-in proposals have not proliferated or
progressed very far toward passage. New Mexico has arguably taken the
proposal the furthest with its significant Medicaid population, program infrastructure, and a modest goal of expanding access for its remaining uninsured. Nevertheless, the political difficulty of funding coverage for its
uninsured, particularly undocumented immigrants, stymied the plan’s ultimate passage.372 The legal and practical constraints of the Medicaid buy-in
make it the narrowest type of public option; however, it is no less politically
difficult than some of the broader types.
2. Marketplace-Based Public Option
MBPOs offer states the most flexibility to achieve their specific policy
goals, yet states may have to choose between conflicting policy goals from
the outset. Some decisions are simple. MBPOs are clearly best for states that
aim to cover bare (or nearly bare) counties. For enrollees of individual and
small group Marketplace plans, lack of competition in the Marketplace is
significant: residents of over seventy percent of counties in the United
States—nearly a third of all enrollees in the ACA Marketplaces—had a
choice of only one or two insurers in 2021.373 MBPOs would provide an
370

See supra Section I.D.1.
See supra Sections I.E, I.F.
372
See Sparer, supra note 37, at 269–70.
373
See Daniel McDermott & Cynthia Cox, Insurer Participation on ACA Marketplaces
2014-2020, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/is371
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additional option in these underserved areas, which may drive beneficial
price competition.
Yet MBPOs face a surprising tradeoff between the goals of improving
competition and reducing premiums. MBPOs’ ability to improve affordability hinges on states’ willingness to constrain provider payments
through ambitious rate caps. States that set timid reimbursement limits may
see few, if any, savings or improvements in affordability from the introduction of the MBPO.374 Similarly, states that rely heavily on private insurers to
administer and finance the MBPO may lose some of the MBPO’s competitive effects or provoke lukewarm efforts by private insurers reluctant to offer
MBPO plans that compete with their existing plans.375 On the other hand, a
state that administers its own plan, imposes stringent payment caps, retains
financial risk and administrative control over the MBPO, and requires (or
strongly nudges) provider participation could shift the market with a substantially cheaper more desirable plan option. The downside is that some
insurers may exit rather than compete.376 The sweet spot between driving
cost savings and maintaining a competitive public-private Marketplace may
be as difficult to find as the proverbial needle in the haystack. In sum, the
state must decide how willing it is to disrupt the existing market in order to
achieve its goals of increased access and affordability.
Despite this challenge, MBPOs remain the most viable form of state
public option because they can mobilize federal dollars to achieve state
health care coverage goals.377 Most of the public option bills we reviewed,
and the plans that have advanced the furthest—in Washington, Nevada, and
Colorado—use the Marketplace to access federal financial subsidies.378
States rely on Marketplace federal subsidies to fund their MBPOs in two
ways. First, residents who purchase MBPO plans on the Marketplace can use
premium tax credits towards purchasing the plan.379 The MBPO directly receives these premium tax credits and, through a more circuitous path, the
cost-sharing reduction payments for eligible residents. The federal funds not
only offset the cost of the plan to the state, they help pay for the MBPO.
Second, if the state obtains a Section 1332 waiver from the federal government, it can access federal pass-through funds of federal savings obtained
from the MBPO’s provider rate controls or other administrative savings.380
Further, states can use Section 1332 to create shared savings programs, alsue-brief/insurer-participation-on-aca-marketplaces-2014-2020/ [https://perma.cc/7WQ4CLFG].
374
See supra Section II.E.2.
375
See supra Sections II.D, II.E.
376
See supra Section II.F.
377
See supra Sections II.B, II.E.
378
See 2019 Wash. Sess. Laws, enacting Engrossed Substitute S.B. 5526, 66th Leg., 2019
Reg. Sess. § 3(1) (Wash. 2019); H.B. 20-1349, 72d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1(10-16107(3.7)(a)) (Colo. 2020).
379
See supra Section II.B.1.
380
See supra Section II.B.2.
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lowing them to keep any federal savings they generate by the public option
plan and potentially use those funds to subsidize additional coverage.
Though there are several ways a state could structure its MBPO, the big
choices revolve around scale and disruption. States that are wary of market
disruption could create a commercially-administered MBPO with modest
provider payment caps, but the results, if any, may likewise be modest, such
as creating an extra plan option here or there and slight downward pressure
on commercial premiums over time.381 Washington and Colorado’s public
options are examples of modest MBPOs. States that want bigger results must
assume a greater role administering, financing, and controlling their
MBPOs.382 Nevada’s model moves in this direction by authorizing the state
to directly administer the public option or award a single contract to a private carrier, requiring providers to participate, and authorizing application
for a Section 1332 ACA waiver to capture premium savings and a Section
1115 Medicaid waiver to combine risk pools with the Medicaid program.
However, these bolder MBPOs must aggressively cap provider payments or
premium rates and consider extending their MBPOs to the large group market to draw in additional covered lives and funds.383 Like any innovation,
Washington’s modest first move may facilitate more robust internal iterations
and inspire other states to take the reform further, building toward a more
transformational vision for a state public option.
3. Comprehensive Public Option
A Comprehensive public option plan is best for states whose goals are
to broadly expand access to all residents of the state, pursue administrative
simplification through a unified public plan that covers previously segmented markets (individual, small, and large groups), improve affordability
and control spending through broadly applicable provider rate caps, and provide a glide-path to single-payer health care.384 Comprehensive plans are distinguishable from other types of state public option plans because they
explicitly extend public coverage to the large group market of employerbased coverage.
Adding the large group target population increases the level of administrative and political difficulty to establish a Comprehensive public option
compared with MBPOs. A state could develop a Comprehensive public option by offering a broad version of the MBPO and opening it up to large
group enrollees, as proposed by Massachusetts, which would require a Section 1332 waiver of the employer mandate and application of federal passthrough funds to new, enlarged subsidies.385 All the lessons for MBPOs
381

See
See
383
See
384
See
385
See
382

supra Section II.E.2.
Hansard, supra note 20.
supra Section II.E.2.
supra Section III.A, III.B.
S.B. 697, 191st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Mass. 2019).

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\59-1\HLL104.txt

210

unknown

Seq: 66

Harvard Journal on Legislation

14-FEB-22

12:23

[Vol. 59

would apply, but the scope and stakes would be higher. The administration,
risk pool, provider rate limits, benefits, and premium and cost-sharing rates
would apply to the entirety of the private insurance market, heightening the
tradeoffs between affordability and insurance market disruption. Yet, presumably, Comprehensive plans are designed to disrupt the market, so the
tradeoff decision has already been made. In addition, Comprehensive plans
offered solely on the Marketplace cannot reach undocumented immigrants,
who cannot purchase coverage on the Marketplace.
The most ambitious Comprehensive public option plans would subsume
the Marketplace into the new state health plan via an expansive Section 1332
waiver, allowing the state to receive all the federal Marketplace subsidies
and pass-through savings and combine these funds and administration into a
larger system that includes Marketplace enrollees and off-Marketplace populations, those ineligible for Marketplace coverage or subsidies, public employees, and even potentially Medicaid beneficiaries.386 This ambitious
version of the Comprehensive public option would entail creation of a new
administrative agency to run the new state health program.
Financing Comprehensive public option plans is also more complex
than financing MBPOs, particularly if the plan aims to capture employer
health spending. To capture the employer share of health coverage, Comprehensive plans will require payroll taxes or mechanisms to collect an employer premium payment for employees who choose the public plan.387
Although these mechanisms may simply replace existing health spending by
large employers and employees, opponents may frame them as new tax increases. Some states, like Massachusetts, have proposed financing narrower
Comprehensive plans through premiums and federal Marketplace subsidies,
while others, like Vermont, also contemplate raising additional state revenue
to provide subsidies to those ineligible for federal subsidies or to supplement
federal subsidies where inadequate.388 Ultimately, Comprehensive plans are
limited to the same three sources of financing as all state-based public option
plans: federal Marketplace subsidies, premiums, and state tax revenue. The
broader the plan, the more sources are tapped.
Surprisingly, the level of legal difficulty for Comprehensive public option plans is not significantly higher than for MBPOs. This doesn’t mean
these plans are easy; a Comprehensive public option plan must still run the
gauntlet to satisfy the ACA’s requirements and obtain an extremely broad
and, to date unheard of, Section 1332 waiver. However, if it can secure the
waiver, then a state can structure its Comprehensive plan to avoid further
entanglements with ERISA and federal tax law. To avoid ERISA preemption, Comprehensive plans should avoid requiring employers to take any
specific action with their health plans, such as including mandating employ386

See supra Section III.D.
See supra Section III.E.1.
388
See supra Section III.E.1.
387
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ers enroll their employees in public coverage or requiring premium contributions if the employee chooses to do so.389 A payroll tax to encourage
participation and capture employer health spending should not raise ERISA
concerns, particularly if the payroll tax preserves employers’ plan choices. A
voluntary, premium-based Comprehensive plan like Massachusetts’ proposal
would avoid ERISA entirely, but it might also fail to capture employers’
health spending. A state payroll tax on employers would roughly preserve
employers’ current tax advantage for offering employee coverage; structuring individual contributions as premiums rather than individual income or
employee payroll taxes would likely avoid the $10,000 cap on state and local
tax deductions.390
B. Universal Advice and Conclusions
To be sure, states have policy alternatives beyond this taxonomy of
public option plans. For instance, states seeking to control costs could regulate provider rates across payers rather than establish a public option, which
may be more economically efficient but may not create coverage options
where they are lacking.391 For administrative simplification, states could pursue a single-payer plan to displace the private insurance market more decisively than contemplated even by Comprehensive public options.392 On the
narrower end of the spectrum, states could pursue a Basic Health Plan or
expand community health centers to provide coverage or services to difficult-to-reach populations.393 We focused on state public option plans, not
because they are the only or even the best health reform model, but rather
because states have been actively pursuing them. These are the lessons we
gleaned from states’ laboratory of public option experimentation.
1. For State Public Option Plans, Bigger Is Better
Narrow plans that target limited slices of the population may not benefit
enough people to gain political support or be worth the inevitable political
battle. A major goal for many states contemplating public options is to reach
populations, such as undocumented immigrants, that have traditionally not
389

See supra Section III.C.1.
See supra Section III.C; Wiley, supra note 16, at 884–85.
391
See, e.g., MICHAEL E. CHERNEW, LEEMORE S. DAFNY & MAXIMILIAN J. PANY, THE
HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL TO CAP PROVIDER PRICES AND PRICE GROWTH IN THE COMHEALTH-CARE MARKET (2020), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/
MERCIAL
CDP_PP_WEB_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEZ9-AGQY]; Fiedler note 104.
392
See, e.g., Fuse Brown & McCuskey, supra note 265; Wiley, supra note 16.
393
See, e.g., Lynn A. Blewett & David Anderson, Examining the New Basic Health Plan
Financing Rule, HEALTH AFFS.: BLOG (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.
1377/hblog20180927.980559/full [https://perma.cc/ULS3-Z5E5]; Samantha Artiga & Maria
Diaz, Health Coverage and Care of Undocumented Immigrants, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 15,
2019), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/health-coverage-andcare-of-undocumented-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/59KT-XSE7].
390
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been covered by existing public or private plans who will likely require additional state subsidies. This throws some cold water on Medicaid buy-in
plans. Not only are they harder to navigate legally, but they do not benefit
enough people to secure a broad coalition of defenders or create enough
market pressure to meaningfully impact health care spending or private
prices.394 While there may be good reasons to try to cover difficult-to-reach
populations through an incremental extension of Medicaid, the state should
be clear that it is not pursuing systemic reform typically associated with a
public option.
Similarly, Marketplace-based plans with a limited target population,
minimal state involvement, and timid provider rate caps are less likely than
more ambitious plans to achieve the goal of cost containment.395 A weak
public option may exert little competitive pressure on private health plans
and do little to control costs or expand coverage. Moreover, a neutered public plan may strengthen the idea that the government cannot do better than
private markets to provide affordable coverage to the population. Since a
weak version of the public option requires nearly as much political capital as
a bolder version, it may only be worth the fight to establish a weak public
option if the state plans to increase cost control measures over time.396
2. Affordability Hinges on Strong Provider Reimbursement Controls
The most common goal of all public option proposals is to improve the
affordability of health care coverage for individuals, employers, and the
state.397 And the most powerful tool to achieve that goal is a state-mandated
cap on provider rates. In fact, a provider rate cap may be all that distinguishes a public option plan that is privately administered and financed from
purely private plans.398
Without question, setting provider payment limits in a public option
plan is politically contentious. Set the rate too low, and providers may not

394
For a discussion of the dangers of a narrow public option in the national context, see
Hacker, supra note 5, at 343 (“Small scale is a policy liability, increasing the changes the plan
would end up attracting enrollees with disproportionately high costs and decreasing its leverage over the system. It is also a political liability because . . . the lack of a strong constituency
or serious stakeholder investment could quell opportunities for expanding the public plan
. . . .”).
395
See Hoffman, supra note 17, at 12 (noting that adding a public option to regions with
only one Marketplace plan could hold down premiums and that “[s]uch benefits are laudable,
but far short of the transformative vision that the public option’s architects had for it”).
396
See id. (“[T]he marginal gains from a competitive public option would have come at a
cost. The public option would have further justified preserving the existing system and
problems with it. Injecting this option into the existing ACA exchanges would perpetuate, and
perhaps even validate, this structure that is causing fundamental problems of inequity and
regulatory bloat in health care.”).
397
See supra Sections I.A, II.A, III.A.
398
See Dafny, supra note 17.

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\59-1\HLL104.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 69

Are State Public Option Health Plans Worth It?

14-FEB-22

12:23

213

participate or may leave altogether.399 Set the rate too high, and the public
option plan will not increase affordability or create competitive pressure for
private plans to reduce their provider rates.400
To create savings, most public option plans benchmark provider payments to public program rates—either Medicare or Medicaid—which are set
by the government and are typically significantly lower than private rates.401
Because Medicaid rates are the lowest, Medicaid buy-in plans that peg provider payments to Medicaid may keep plans affordable, but risk limiting the
plans’ viability and reach due to low provider participation. Marketplacebased or Comprehensive plans typically use Medicare rates as the benchmark, but selecting the Medicare multiple (101%, 125%, 160%) is politically
fraught and also risks entrenching fee-for-service payment, cost-shifting, and
incentives for providers to make up in volume what they lose in price.
Owing to the political challenges of imposing stringent provider rate
caps, states are now shifting their cost control efforts to mandated premium
cuts for the public option plan paired with stronger provider participation
requirements.402 It remains to be seen whether this strategy of forcing private
payers and providers to the table to negotiate their own cuts will prove effective at controlling costs and fairly distribute payment cuts across providers
and services.
3. Not “Buying In”
Due to legal constraints, allowing anyone to simply “buy in” to existing public coverage, such as Medicaid, is not viable.403 Instead, states interested in a buy-in typically lean on their private contractors, such as
Medicaid-managed care plans, to create a parallel plan that uses similar provider networks, reimbursement rates, benefit design, and administration.
This parallel public plan can then be offered to non-eligible groups and individuals on and off the Marketplace. But these mock “buy ins” do not allow
states to capture the efficiencies of a direct buy-in: risk pooling, administrative and communication efficiencies, access to federal funds, and legal pro-

399
See Fiedler, supra note 104, at 7–9 (concluding that a public option that pays lower
rates than private rates would reduce premiums in the market, but noting that provider exit and
negotiating rather than setting prices would diminish impact).
400
See ROBERT BERENSON, JOHN HOLAHAN & STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN, URB. INST., GETTING TO A PUBLIC OPTION THAT CONTAINS COSTS: NEGOTIATIONS, OPT-OUTS AND TRIGGERS 2
(2009), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/30756/411984-Getting-to-a-Public-Option-that-Contains-Costs-Negotiations-Opt-Outs-and-Triggers.PDF [https://perma.cc/38
VX-ERWZ] (“A strong public option can contribute significantly to reducing subsidy costs
and to system wide cost containment. A weak public option would likely not serve that role. A
public option that begins with a small market share and would be required to negotiate prices
with providers, often from a position of weakness, would do little to contain health care
costs.”).
401
See supra Sections I.E.2, II.E.2, III.E.2.
402
See supra Part IV (discussing 2021 bills).
403
See supra Section I.B.

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\59-1\HLL104.txt

214

unknown

Seq: 70

Harvard Journal on Legislation

14-FEB-22

12:23

[Vol. 59

tections that come with participation in actual Medicaid or state employee
health plans. Thus, despite its intuitive appeal, a direct buy-in to public coverage is a nonstarter for states.
4. Finance Through the Marketplaces
As noted above, a deep well of federal funds runs through the Marketplaces.404 Congress deepened the well with a two-year enhancement of Marketplace subsidies in the pandemic response package, the American Rescue
Plan.405 This makes Marketplace-based public option plans both the most
enticing and financially viable option for states. However, for a state to capture the maximum amount of savings possible by adding a public option to
the Marketplace, it needs to run its own state-based Marketplace and secure
a Section 1332 waiver from the federal government. The wellspring of federal funds flowing through the Marketplace means that in addition to
MBPOs, states contemplating Medicaid buy-in plans and Comprehensive
plans should consider a version of the plan that could be sold on the Marketplace. So central are the Marketplaces to state public option plans that, if the
ACA were to be struck down by the Supreme Court, the entire structure for
modern state public options would need reimagining.406
Other than federal subsidies available via the Marketplaces, few other
sources of federal funding exist to support a state public option. The simplest
funding source, both legally and politically, is premiums. States could offer
Marketplace plans to large employers to slow the growth of commercial premiums and expand the public option’s reach, buying power, and risk pool,
but this strategy would require a Section 1332 waiver.407 Relying solely on
premiums, however, may make the public option plan unaffordable to many
(including undocumented immigrants and those affected by the family glitch
or subsidy cliff) and may fail to fully capture employers’ coverage contributions. The broadest versions of the public option draw on all three available
funding sources, including pass-through federal Marketplace funds via a
Section 1332 waiver, individual premiums, and new state revenues from
payroll taxes to capture the employer contributions.

404

See supra Sections II.B.2, II.E.
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, H.R. 1319, 117th Cong. § 9661 (2021). The Act
increased existing premium tax credits for those earning between 100% and 400% of the FPL
and extended premium tax credits to those earning more than 400% of the FPL, eliminating the
subsidy cliff through the end of plan year 2022.
406
The Supreme Court denied the most recent constitutional challenge to the ACA on the
grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing. See California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2120
(2021).
407
States seeking a Section 1332 waiver for sweeping changes should also be aware of the
deficit neutrality requirement that would reduce pass-through savings by any reduction in federal revenue caused by the plan, including increases in Medicaid enrollment or decreases in
federal tax revenue. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
405
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5. Competition and Disruption
All public option plans seek to inject competition into the private health
insurance market by adding a public plan that can exert downward pressure
on prices and provide additional choices to consumers. Indeed, all the plans
we reviewed would initially increase competition. Yet the proposals and
their endgames diverge from there. States must decide how much they want
the public option to disrupt the private health insurance market. Answers can
range from “not at all” (just seeking to cover remaining uninsured) to “maximally” (seeking a glide path to single-payer). A state’s answer to this question will drive the design of its public option.
States that use the full arsenal of regulatory authority to control prices
by imposing stringent, market-wide rate caps will achieve the greatest potential cost savings and radically displace the incumbent private health insurance system by outcompeting on price.408 To states favoring this approach,
the private insurance market has failed to deliver universal coverage or control costs. In this maximalist view, the public plan would eventually cover
most state residents—including those with employer-based coverage—harnessing economies of scale from administrative savings, a massive and stable risk pool, and formidable purchasing power. Providers would have no
choice but to participate in a public plan this large. This comprehensive version of the public option promises significant market disruption, especially
for commercial insurers, but also the greatest potential savings and scope.
Other states may be wary or politically incapable of enacting a public
option plan that disrupts providers and drives commercial insurers out of the
market. These states can instead preserve a multi-payer system and increase
choice and affordability for consumers, particularly in the individual and
small group markets. These models embrace a managed competition approach, and if private insurers can compete efficiently within the state’s price
constraints, the public option has done its job.409 These middle-path states,
like Washington, may enlist private insurers to administer and potentially
profit from the public option plan and set generous provider rate caps to
mollify and encourage their participation, but the plans’ effects on costs,
choice, access, and coverage may be accordingly modest.410
Taken together, the range of state public option plans reveal a fundamental tension between competition and cost control. The more ambitious
the provider rate controls, the more likely the public plan will constrain
health care prices and premiums, but also the more likely it will disrupt the
extant market, perhaps even displacing private insurance options and ulti408
See Brian J. Miller & Robert E. Moffit, Choice, Competition, and Flexibility, Part I:
Post-ACA Consumer Challenges, HEALTH AFFS.: BLOG (Aug. 19, 2020), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200813.191190/full/ [https://perma.cc/9WW5B9LB]; see also UCCELLO, supra note 109, at 12–13.
409
See Wiley, supra note 16, at 2191.
410
See supra Section I.E.2.
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mately reducing choices. On the other hand, a strong commitment to preserving choices and competition among private health plans will require
more modest public plan provider rate caps, sacrificing the public option’s
downward pressure on costs. This paradox means that a public option cannot
simultaneously increase choice among competitors and significantly reduce
costs. As Allison Hoffman has argued, the paradox results from a misplaced
commitment to choice among multiple health plans.411 In health insurance,
choice is less important and less valuable than cost-control, and were a state
to choose between a public option that increases choices and one that
reduces costs for consumers, it should choose the latter.
In the end, the state must identify its goal and its role in the reform
effort, and that will answer how much disruption it will tolerate. To take an
analogy from education, is the state trying to establish an affordable flagship
public university system that will serve as a market leader and benchmark
for private competitors, or is the state trying to establish a charter school
system to inject a few additional choices that are publicly funded but privately run? The former is more disruptive, more expensive, and more transformative. The latter is much more modest and may hardly be called
systemic reform.
C. Federalism Implications
Our comprehensive review of state public option proposals also reveals
some lessons for federalism in health reforms. Although this article does not
set out to answer whether any state should pursue a public option or whether
the federal government is better suited to such reforms, it does show that
states have a considerably more difficult path to public option health reform
than the federal government. States are faced with legal constraints from
federal statutes (e.g., Medicaid, ACA, ERISA, and federal tax law), many of
which are intended to protect beneficiaries and the federal budget, which
means that states cannot simply extend existing public programs to new
populations.412 To give states a path through the labyrinthine legal requirements to systemic reforms, progressive members of Congress have proposed
federal legislation that would modify these statutory constraints to give
states greater flexibility to pursue state-level public options or other universal health reforms.413 Even if federal reform is on the table, it would be worth
enacting these federal pathways to state-based reform so we can learn from
the laboratory of the states. However, broad federal waivers and additional
state flexibility risk being weaponized to scale back coverage and protec-

411

See Hoffman, supra note 17, at 2.
See supra Sections I.B, II.B, III.C.
See State-Based Universal Health Care Act of 2018, H.R. 6097, 115th Cong. (2018);
State Public Option Act, H.R. 1277, 116th Cong. (2019).
412
413
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tions.414 Thus, any additional state flexibility legislation must contain sufficient guardrails to serve as a one-way ratchet—allowing state
experimentation that enhances coverage, access, equity, and consumer protections over federal baselines, while prohibiting state policies that would
undermine existing federal coverage.415 This is no small feat. The guardrails
in Section 1115 of Medicaid and Section 1332 of the ACA have been systematically assaulted but have largely held fast. Attempts to promote greater
state flexibility must preserve these protective bulwarks.
Given his support for a federal public option while a candidate, President Biden could take concrete steps to advance state public option reforms.
In particular, the Biden Administration could enact regulations designed to
assist states in obtaining Section 1332 waivers, Section 1115 waivers, or an
unprecedented super-waiver combining both, to promote a state public option as a vehicle for systemic reforms.416 These regulations could streamline
access to federal pass-through funds and provide guidance on expanding eligible populations, the limitations on use of federal funds, establishing a
state-agency as a QHP, and receiving premiums and premium tax credits.
Equally as important as federal legal constraints are fiscal constraints.
States cannot deficit-spend, and most are constitutionally required to balance
their budgets every year.417 Thus, states are inherently more limited in their
ability to generate new funding streams to pay for or subsidize coverage for
difficult-to-reach populations. States must therefore rely on federal funding
and private spending to finance the bulk of their public option proposals.
This reliance on federal financing imposes a significant structural limit on
state universal health reform.
Although federal reform may be the ultimate answer, states have an
essential role to play. They are the engines of federalist innovation. Salutary
and failed state experiments provide essential policy design lessons. Even
with all their limitations, successful state public option plans will inform and
enhance federal health reform. Thus, we all benefit from clearing existing

414
See Nicole Huberfeld, Sidney Watson & Alison Barkoff, Struggle for the Soul of Medicaid, 48 J. L. MED. ETHICS 429, 430–31 (2020); see also Matthew B. Lawrence, Fiscal Waivers and State “Innovation” in Health Care, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1477, 1506 (2021); Sara
Rosenbaum, Weakening Medicaid from Within, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Oct. 19, 2017), https://
prospect.org/power/weakening-medicaid-within/ [https://perma.cc/A2LK-C93F].
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legal and fiscal hurdles to state health reforms that move toward universal
coverage and effective cost control.
CONCLUSION
Are public option plans worth it? Yes, if the state goes big. The ACA
advanced the U.S. health system toward the perennial goals of universal access to affordable, comprehensive coverage. Nevertheless, political and legal
setbacks have stymied the full realization of these goals. The next big thing
in health reform appears to be a public option, and the states have been
actively developing a variety of state-level public option proposals. Three
main models of a state public option have emerged that vary in scope and
ambition. Though all three models are viable, the degree of legal difficulty is
not much greater for the broadest plans than the narrowest ones, while effectiveness increases with the plan’s scope. Thus, for state public option plans,
bigger is better. Though states have a path forward, they remain constrained
by current fiscal and legal federalism. When states can’t test models of health
reform, we all lose. Thus, for states to function as true laboratories of health
reform, they need greater flexibility from Congress and the administration in
the forms of broad statutory waivers and new legal pathways to prove
whether a public option is indeed worth it.
***
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APPENDIX: TABLE
State
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Total

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

OF

STATE PUBLIC OPTION BILLS 2010-2021

Year
Medicaid Buy-ins
Connecticut
2018
Georgia
2020
Georgia
2021
Indiana
2019
Iowa
2018
Massachusetts
2017
Massachusetts
2019
Minnesota
2015
Nevada
2017
Nevada
2021
New Mexico
2019
Oklahoma
2021
Oregon
2019
South Carolina
2021
Tennessee
2021
Texas
2019
Texas
2021
Texas
2021
Wisconsin
2017
West Virginia
2020
West Virginia
2021
Wyoming
2018
16 states

Bill Number
H.B. 5463
S.B. 339
S.B. 83
S.B. 444
H.F. 2002
S.B. 2211
H.B. 1132
H.F. 2749 / S.F. 2356
A.B. 374
S.B. 420*,**
H.B. 416 / S.B. 405
H.B. 1808
H.B. 2009
H.B. 3573
S.B. 418 / H.B. 602
H.B. 2313
H.B. 512
H.B. 4084
A.B. 449 / S.B. 363
H.B. 4789
H.B. 3001
S.B. 88
22 bills

Marketplace-based Public Options
Colorado
2020
H.B. 1349
Colorado
2021
H.B. 1232**
Connecticut
2019
H.B. 7267 LCO 9710
Connecticut
2020
S.B. 346
Connecticut
2021
S.B. 842
Illinois
2014
H.B. 5733
Massachusetts
2011
H.B. 1228*
Massachusetts
2013
S.B. 514*
Massachusetts
2015
H.B. 1033*
Massachusetts
2017
S.B. 618*
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2017
2019
2021
2019
2021
2020
2011
2015
2017
2020
2019
2017
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State
Massachusetts
Massachusetts
Massachuestts
Minnesota
Nevada
New Jersey
Vermont
Vermont
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Washington
10 states

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Comprehensive Public Options
Massachusetts
2011
H.B. 1228*
Massachusetts
2013
S.B. 514*
Massachusetts
2015
H.B. 1033*
Massachusetts
2017
S.B. 638*
Massachusetts
2019
S.B. 697*
Michigan
2018
H.B. 6285
New Jersey
2016
A.B. 4211 / S.B. 3138
New Jersey
2018
A.B. 1343
New Jersey
2020
S.B. 1947*
New Jersey
2021
A.B. 5029
Vermont
2011
H.B. 146
Vermont
2015
H.B. 88*
Vermont
2017
H.B. 28*
Washington
2019
H.B. 1104
Washington
2019
S.B. 5222
5 states
15 bills
23 states

* Bills counted in more than one category
** Bills signed into law

Bill Number
S.B. 638*
S.B. 697*
S.B. 787
H.F. 2184 / S.F. 2302
S.B. 420*,**
S.B. 1947*
S.B. 109
H.B. 88*
H.B. 28*
H.B. 530
S.B. 5526**
S.F. 5984
21 bills

49 bills
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INTRODUCED PUBLIC OPTION BILLS 2010-2021**

**States are shaded based on the most comprehensive public option introduced. For example, Massachusetts considered all three types of public option plans and is therefore shown in the darkest color.
Vertical lines denote a state that signed a public option bill into law.
Note that Washington passed an MBPO but is shown in black because it also
considered a comprehensive public option bill in 2019.
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